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ABSTRACT
BUREAUCRACIES OF REMOVAL:
THE LABOR AND LOGICS OF US IMMIGRATION COURTS
Dylan Farrell-Bryan
Emilio Parrado
Amada Armenta

With the intensification of immigration enforcement, detention, and deportation in the
United States in recent years, an ever-increasing number of immigrants find themselves in
immigration court facing removal from the United States. As the site where immigration
judges and prosecutors decide who will be deported and who can remain in the United
States, the immigration court is an important, yet understudied, institution in the
immigration enforcement bureaucracy. Situating this study at the intersection of sociolegal
literatures on immigration enforcement, bureaucracies, and decision-making, each chapter
of this dissertation focuses on how the judges, prosecutors, and immigration attorneys
navigate the labor of removal in immigration court. Drawing on in-depth interviews and
ethnographic observations of these court actors, I link their bureaucratic working
conditions, as well as varying professional norms, to the process and outcomes of
immigration removal hearings. While illuminating the black box of immigration court
workings, this project explicitly contributes to research on legal decision-making and the
bureaucratic values revealed in the process of adjudicating the important public, civil, and
criminal justice issue that is immigration in the United States.
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PREFACE
Both legally and politically, the US immigration court is unique in the American
legal system. Located outside of the judiciary, the immigration court or Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR), is one arm of the federal immigration enforcement
apparatus in which immigration judges decide thousands of removal cases each year.
During a time of unprecedented intensification in immigration enforcement, detention, and
deportation practices in recent years,1 this court system has seen a sharp rise in the number
of immigrants facing removal from the United States.2 As the site where immigration
judges decide who is deported and who can remain in the country, immigration court is an
important institution in the immigration enforcement bureaucracy, and yet has received
little scholarly attention.
My dissertation examines how immigration court functions on the ground, focusing
in particular on the labor, identity, and logics of the individuals who work in this system –
the judges, government prosecutors, and the attorneys – whose concerted efforts impact
thousands of lives and remap the population of the United States. Whether they work as
representatives of the state, or representing noncitizens in removal proceedings, this study
aims to understand how these court actors articulate and negotiate their preferences, norms,
and constraints within the courtroom. Moreover, how do these preferences, norms, and
constraints shape decision-making and the exercise of discretion in granting relief or
ordering removal? In the three separate articles of this dissertation, I draw on 110 in-depth

1

Scholars have primarily identified this shift as due to mid-1990s statutory and policy changes in immigration
law that broadened the list of crimes that can initiate removal proceedings, as well as increased cooperation
between local and federal immigration enforcement practices.
2
The immigration court system of the United States operates two parallel dockets for immigrants facing
removal, one for detained and one for non-detained respondents.
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interviews with these court actors, as well as ten months of ethnographic observations of
court proceedings to trace the processes and decision-making that shape the theater – and
outcomes – of removal proceedings in the immigration courtroom.
Understanding Immigration Court
In immigration court, removal proceedings begin when the DHS3 serves an
individual with a charging document called a Notice to Appear (NTA), and files it with an
immigration court. Once received by the court, the respondent is scheduled for a brief
initial hearing called a master calendar hearing, in which the judge makes an initial
determination about the validity of the grounds for removal and assesses the plan for the
case. This preliminary hearing is usually followed by a longer, in-depth hearing, called an
individual merits hearing, lasting around four hours. Here, all the facts of the case are fully
questioned and discussed by all court actors over the hours-long proceeding which
culminates in a decision by the immigration judge. Broadly, the potential final outcomes
of removal proceedings can include being granted relief from removal (relief or case
termination), or being removed from the country (voluntary departure,4 or removal5). If the
decision is appealed, it will go on to the BIA and possibly, federal court. The steps to this
process are seen in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 in appendix]

3

Either through U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), or U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
4
If an immigration judge determines that an immigrant is legally removable, there are several options for
“relief,” if there is a form of “relief,” such as asylum, cancelation of removal, or adjustment of status for
which they are eligible. Voluntary departure is technically considered a form of relief.
5
If an immigrant should miss a court date for any reason, he or she can be deported in absentia without a
hearing.
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The primary actors in the courtroom are the immigration judge6, the government
prosecutor from the Department of Homeland Security, the attorney for the respondent
(when the respondent is represented)7, and the detained or non-detained respondent, who
faces charges of removal from the government. Each of the court actors articulates a
different, often competing set of preferences, norms, and constraints, the enactment of
which shapes the process of the removal proceeding, and ultimately, the legal decisionmaking of the immigration judge. During the proceeding, both attorneys have the
opportunity to frame their case by questioning the respondent and making arguments to the
judge. The government attorney, as the prosecutor, argues for the removal of the
respondent, drawing on Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidelines for
removal and interagency data on country conditions, financial, and crime records. The
attorney for the respondent, if present, argues for relief from removal for their client. The
respondent in court should act as a credible witness, answering all questions from the
attorneys, and providing believable testimony to convince the judge of his or her eligibility
and deservingness for relief from removal. The immigration judge considers the arguments,
and finally, he or she will make and justify a decision about whether to either grant relief
or order removal.
Immigration Court as a Site of Enforcement and Discretion

6

Immigration judges who adjudicate removal proceedings are often career attorneys, appointed by the US
Attorney General (AG) to serve as administrative judges within the Department of Justice (DOJ). As such,
they are employed for indefinite terms and not subject to some of the personnel regulations of employees in
civil service (Benson and Wheeler 2012).
7
The respondent is often, but not always, represented by an attorney. Immigration and Nationality Act §
240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented,
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such
proceedings.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due
process right to obtain counsel of their choice at their own expense.”
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The criminalization of migration, or ‘crimmigration,’ refers to the growing body of
socio-legal scholarship that charts the ongoing convergence of the criminal justice and civil
immigration laws, procedures, and cultural norms. Legal scholars have described a pattern
of increasingly punitive convergence with immigration law and criminal procedure within
the development of law (Chacon 2009; Legomsky 2007; Miller 2005; Stumpf 2006).8
Within this broader literature, there is a burgeoning sociolegal literature that has focused
on the labor of border patrol, policing, and deportation officers as the main locus of
immigration enforcement (Armenta 2019; Bohn and Pugatch 2015; Coleman 2012;
Dingeman et al. 2017; Vega 2018). This work has revealed a complex system of on-theground practices showing how street-level immigration officers justify and legitimate their
work (Armenta 2016; Vega 2018), as well as an increasing tendency to criminalize
immigrants (Dingeman et al. 2017) that has funneled immigrants into an expanding federal
deportation system (Coleman and Kocher 2011). However, despite this growing body of
work, there has been less attention paid to the practices of the immigration court
bureaucrats, despite the important role immigration courts play in the immigration
enforcement apparatus.
While important quantitative sociolegal research focuses on predicting removal
outcomes (Eagly and Shafer 2016; Ryo 2016), this dissertation contributes to a small but

8

Many scholars point to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) as the watershed legislation that reshaped the landscape of immigration enforcement and
criminalization in the United States. It has led to a series of increasingly punitive measures (Stumpf 2006),
with scholars identifying three primary trends: 1) increasingly harsh criminal consequences associated with
the violation of migration laws, 2) the use of deportation/removal as a proxy for criminal punishment for
noncitizens, and 3) the increasing use of criminal law processes (law enforcement and other mechanisms) in
civil proceedings (Chacón 2010). The blurring relationship between criminal punishment and immigration
law (Kanstroom 2003) points to a “new penology” or punitive turn in the civil proceedings of immigration
law and enforcement (Feeley 2017; Miller 2005; Simon 1998).
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growing body of qualitative sociolegal research that examines the street-level processes of
the immigration court on the ground, including the understandings and meanings that court
officials assign to the labor of enforcement and removal (Abel 2011; Asad 2019; MonteroColbert, Tekgurler, and Deckard 2019; Oxford 2005; Ricciardelli et al. 2019). Immigration
court proceedings involve two central actors that are frequently characterized as
discretionary, street-level bureaucrats, the immigration judge and the government
prosecutor (Castro 2016). The theory of street-level bureaucracy argues that frontline
workers enforce policy while interacting with the individuals who are subject to that policy
(Lipsky 1980). These frontline workers have a high degree of discretionary capacity as
they make decisions to enforce policy (Asad 2019; Heimer 2008), and thus act either as
rule-followers, making routine, perfunctory decisions that align with the institutional laws
(Gilboy 1991), or as rule-benders, in which they exercise discretion when encountering
cases they view as ‘deserving’ (Zacka 2017). In their exercise of discretion, Lipsky argues,
street-level bureaucrats effectively make policy through their discretionary decisionmaking. As street-level bureaucrats, both immigration judges and DHS attorneys face
complex cases that require legal dexterity and provide opportunities to use discretion. In
this dissertation, I interrogate the conceptualization of immigration court actors as streetlevel bureaucrats, examining how the constraints on the immigration court have remapped
the experience of discretionary decision-making in removal proceedings for all parties.
Using these broad sociolegal literatures, this project moves beyond the quantitative
trend of identifying predictors of removal and considers the on-the-ground processes
occurring in the immigration courtroom. Because the power of the state to regulate
immigrants and immigration emerges from the routine procedures and preferences of
xvi

institutional actors, I examine the immigration courtroom and its actors in the tradition of
research “from the bottom up,” as the processes are unfolding in real time (Gravelle,
Ellermann, and Dauvergne 2013). This includes in-depth interviews with court actors and
an observational court ethnography of removal proceedings. While the existing studies
have been able to identify the strength and direction of various quantitative predictors of
removal, they have been unable to capture fully the interactional, relational dynamics of
immigrant selection at work in the theater of the courtroom and how those dynamics vary
among the court actors: immigration judges, prosecutors, and attorneys.
Roadmap of Dissertation
Since each chapter in this dissertation has been written for article publication, I
detail the different methodological approaches and theoretical contributions in each one.
Each article focuses on a different set of actors and questions within the immigration court
bureaucracy. After presenting the three separate articles of this dissertation, I end with a
brief conclusion that aims to pull out the major themes and future directions of this work.
Below is a brief description of each article:
The first article in this dissertation examines the topic of time, waiting, and
temporality in the immigration court system, and draws on interviews with immigration
attorneys to better understand how they manage time to shield their clients from harm. I
focus on legal temporality, or the volatility between time and immigration law, arguing
that attorneys strategically exploit time by delaying or expediting their clients’ cases within
a long-backlogged bureaucracy. Delayed time, in contrast to previous conceptualizations
of waiting, is frequently used by practitioners as an opportunity to craft legal legibility in
an increasingly restrictive legal enforcement landscape.
xvii

The second article focuses on the Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorneys
who prosecute noncitizens’ removal cases on behalf of the federal government. In this
article, I examine how these career bureaucrats legitimize and justify their labor in an
increasingly polarized political landscape. Extending the literatures on self-legitimacy and
the social psychology of enforcement officers, I argue that a less-understood pathway to
self-legitimacy is derived through bureaucratic entrenchment: high internalization of duty
to the law and a sense of patriotic moral authority while disputing noncitizens’ claims to
asylum.
The third and final article addresses the labor of removal from the perspective of
the immigration judges, who act as the final arbiters of the noncitizens’ courtroom
proceedings. While immigration judges are most commonly positioned in the literature as
discretionary, independent actors, this article extends our knowledge of these decisionmakers by examining the internal, contingent (micro)management structure of the
immigration court bureaucracy. I argue that the state's management of immigration judges
increases precarity among noncitizens in the immigration court system and suggest that it
might operate as a different form of migration control, distinct from macro-level border
policy or front-line decision-making of street-level bureaucrats. The article reveals the
banal ways that the state controls both adjudicators and noncitizens within a broader
trajectory of contemporary punitive immigration policy.

xviii

1.

LEGAL TEMPORALITY: SHIFTING LAW AND THE LOGICS OF
WAITING IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT BUREAUCRACY

Abstract
Current scholarship has explored how time and waiting operate in the bureaucratic state to
regulate and control populations. In the bureaucracy of immigration enforcement, time is
characterized by extensive delays in entry, detention, and processing of noncitizens’ cases,
yet little attention has been paid to how time impacts legality and strategy in removal
proceedings. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews in the Baltimore
immigration court, this article examines the bureaucratic time of the immigration court
system, asking: what is the relationship between time and immigration law for removal
proceedings, and how do immigration attorneys and noncitizens manage time in the court
bureaucracy? I focus on how time and immigration law fluctuate together in what I term
legal temporality, and the ways it shapes the legal cases of noncitizens awaiting removal
hearings. Given the volatility between time and immigration law in the court bureaucracy,
cases that are subject to long delays are more likely to move in and out of legal viability
under existing law. As such, bureaucratic delays may offer opportunities for attorneys and
noncitizens to strengthen their cases, put their affairs in order, or have a more favorable
legal landscape for their hearings. Highlighting two divergent logics of waiting, I detail
how attorneys and noncitizens adapt to the legal temporality of the bureaucracy by
strategically expediting or delaying immigration court processes in the unstable legal field.
I argue that these strategies help to craft legal legibility and shield noncitizens from the
temporal regime imposed by the state. By extending our conceptualizations of time and
waiting in bureaucracies, this article illustrates how time impacts legality and case strength,
1

with implications for how we understand the so-called political crisis of the immigration
court backlog.

2

Introduction
While clock-time shapes social life, from daily schedules and efficiency
expectations to cultural beliefs that ‘time is money,’ scholars have actively challenged the
assumption that the experience of time (and waiting) is universal. Indeed, scholars have
argued that temporality, or how time is socially organized and experienced, differs widely
within and across individuals, organizations, cultures, and positionalities (Bluedorn and
MJ Waller 2006). In state bureaucracies, time and waiting have been described as key
features used to regulate and control populations (Bourdieu 2000). Across a number of
bureaucratic contexts, including public hospitals (Lara-Millán 2014), welfare agencies
(Auyero 2011), unemployment offices (Nielsen, Danneris, and Monrad 2021), and prisons
(Kotova 2018), scholars have described how bureaucratic waiting is often leveraged by
internal actors as a form of social control. Extended waiting and delay, scholars argue,
produces feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability (Schwartz 1975), and the “subjective
effects of dependency and subordination” among marginalized groups (Auyero 2011:8).
Similarly, time in the bureaucracy of immigration enforcement mirrors this
temporal reality. In line with existing literature, the state subjects noncitizens to multiple
temporal tensions starting as soon as they are entered into the immigration enforcement
bureaucracy (Griffiths 2014). Research has shown how the state imposes punitive temporal
regimes to either speed up detection and removal, or to slow down entry, detention, and
integration processes (Boyce 2020; Conlon 2011; Gill 2009). In immigration court
specifically, noncitizens are subject to extensive delays before cases are heard by an
immigration judge. Indeed, the number of backlogged cases in immigration court has
ballooned in recent years, with 1.7 million cases pending nationally in 2022 (as seen in
3

Figure 1.1). With these record-high levels of delay, cases can remain on the docket for
years; on average, immigration cases take 974 days to be completed nationwide (TRAC
2022).9

[Figure 1.1 in appendix]

Politically, the state continues to produce this record-high backlog in real time,
while framing the resulting delay as an urgent political crisis. In 2021, vice-president
Kamala Harris described the immigration court agency as a “deeply broken system”
(Villarreal 2022), even as her own administration added to the growing backlog in court
through ongoing enforcement of immigration. Additionally, immigration law is one of the
more volatile bodies of law, subject to numerous administrative changes, including
executive orders, shifting policy directives, and agency reprioritizations through the
Executive branch that reshape the law’s implementation. For example, during the four
years of the Trump administration alone, nearly 500 administrative changes remapped
many aspects of the US immigration system (Bolter, Israel, and Pierce 2022). Some
attempts have been made to speed up the process by creating special rules to expedite
certain types of cases through the court process (J. R. McHenry 2018), or limit the time to
completion (Executive Office for Immigration Review 2020b), although this process has
largely been criticized as undermining noncitizens right to due process (Alanko 2021).
Overwhelmingly, recent changes to immigration law have worked to limit individual

9

Nationwide, courts experienced 1,214% increase in pending cases since 1998 (TRAC 2022).
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claims by noncitizens, by restricting access to immigration benefits such as asylum, and
expanding the list of offenses that lead to removal from the United States (Chacon 2009;
Salyer 2018).
Given these features of the immigration court bureaucracy, the longer cases wait in
a court backlog, the more likely they are to move in and out of legal viability. In other
words, as the laws change over time, a so-called strong case for asylum may become weak,
and vice versa. This temporal and legal instability is widely condemned as an urgent
problem to be solved, yet limited research has empirically examined how lawyers and
noncitizens respond to this temporal reality on the ground. Given that much of the existing
scholarship on waiting focuses on time as punishment and control, I focus instead on how
advocates manage (and respond to) time as both a strategy and an obstacle. I hypothesize
that while the experience of delay may be punishing for some, waiting may also offer
opportunities to strengthen cases, put affairs in order, or wait for a more favorable legal
landscape for hearings.
In order to explore this, I ask a two-part question: first, what is the relationship
between bureaucratic time and law in the immigration court, and second, how do attorneys
and noncitizens manage the temporal landscape? I draw on ten months of ethnographic
observations of detained and nondetained removal proceedings, and 40 in-depth interviews
with immigration attorneys to explore how attorneys and noncitizens strategically adapt to
the temporal regime of the state. Introducing a conceptual framework of legal temporality
to describe the unique relationship between law and time, I show how attorneys and
noncitizens manage this temporal uncertainty by strategically expediting or delaying
immigration court processes in this unstable legal field. I argue that these strategies, or
5

logics of waiting, work to craft legal legibility, manage uncertainty, and shield noncitizens
from temporal harm imposed by the state. By extending our conceptualizations of time and
waiting in bureaucracies, this article demonstrates how experiences of time vary across
legal conditions, with implications for how to think about the so-called ‘political crisis’ of
the immigration court backlog.
Literature Review
Time and Temporality in Bureaucracies
There is a substantial body of literature on the sociological study of temporality,
time, and waiting in bureaucracies, particularly on how different actors manage time. Time,
scholars argue, represents “a socio-temporal order which regulates the structure and
dynamics of social life” (Zerubavel 1982:2). As such, who is experiencing time matters
greatly – and time can be used differently, depending on one’s subject position in relation
to a bureaucracy. Pierre Bourdieu argues that time and waiting are key features of power
and domination; “to keep people waiting, delaying without ruining their hope, is an
exercise of power over people’s time” (2000:228). Within a bureaucracy, more powerful
actors might impose a delay to demean the value of subordinates within the institution
(Schwartz 1975), an exercise of power that reinforces an unequal hierarchy. Other studies
of social inequality have shown how bureaucrats in institutions such as public hospitals
(Lara-Millán 2014), welfare agencies (Auyero 2011), unemployment offices (Nielson
2021), and prisons (Kotova 2018) often require marginalized individuals to wait (their turn;
or for services) in a manner that is both punitive and commonplace. In such studies of
bureaucracies, scholars demonstrate how time and waiting are frequently leveraged as tools

6

of social control and punishment, producing feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability
among the poor and marginalized (Auyero 2011; Schwartz 1975).
In line with this research, recent migration scholarship has similarly pointed to time
and waiting as precarious and punishing (Anderson 2007; Griffiths, Rogers, and Bridget
2013). Specifically, time is frequently weaponized against irregular migrants by the state:
on one hand, the state uses time to speed up detection, enforcement, and removal
(Andersson 2014), while also slowing mobility by delaying border crossing, lengthening
detention time, and implementing bureaucratic wait times to otherwise frustrate, exhaust,
and criminalize noncitizens seeking safe haven (Boyce 2020; Conlon 2011). Given this,
scholars have shown how temporality is useful to understand practices of social control
and punishment in a variety of national and incarceration contexts (Griffiths 2014; Mountz
2011; Turnbull 2016), as well as for how migrants themselves conceptualize time for their
future trajectories into integration (Allsopp, Chase, and Mitchell 2015; Omar 2022).
However, despite the importance of these findings on how the state often imposes
delay to control marginalized populations, few studies focus on how different actors
leverage time to protect migrants from state harm. In the empirical case of immigration
courts, waiting (in court backlog) has the effect of changing the viability and strength of
cases as immigration laws change over time. In turn, immigration lawyers respond to this
legal landscape by carefully managing time – attempting to expedite cases or slow them
down, in order to both craft legal legibility for their clients and shield them from harm.
Considering the unprecedented case backlog in US immigration courts, theories of time
and waiting have yet to be meaningfully linked to legal legibility in removal proceedings.

7

Below, I detail how attorneys craft legal legibility, highlighting areas in which time and
waiting merit greater attention.
Crafting Legal Legibility
As legal changes have limited the number of viable claims that can be made to
immigration courts (Chacon 2009), individuals must make cases legible to the courts
despite the increasingly narrow legal options (Salyer 2018). In the broader literature on
legal legibility, the process of making any case legible to the courts often relies on the
professional expertise of attorneys as intermediaries (Parsons 1963), who engage with their
clients in an interactive process (Katz 1982) in order to “frame” (Gitlin 1980; Goffman
1959) or “script” (Heimer 1999) cases to meet the expectations of legal decision-makers
and the existing law (Coutin 2008; Silbey 1981). In this process, attorneys perform the
important labor of translating between their clients’ experiences and the court’s
requirements, responding to strict procedural guidelines while advocating in their clients’
interests. Scholars have theorized the client-attorney relationship beyond a transactional
provision of service to an “interactive process” in which attorneys get to know their clients
personal and emotional needs, understand their histories, and craft their legibility through
ongoing “negotiations” between the client and the attorney (Katz 1982:23).
In immigration hearings, lawyers work to build narratives in response to the
existing law, carefully crafting narratives of gendered deservingness (Bhuyan, Yoon, and
Valmadrid 2020), violence (Lakhani 2013), or Americanness (Farrell-Bryan 2022; Galli
2020) to make cases appear more legally legible and sympathetic to the presiding
immigration judge. In addition to the narrative framing, scholars have also charted the
importance of physical documentation in crafting legible cases in immigration court, from
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finding proper proofs (Kim 2011) to showing continuous residence (Allard 2018). These
approaches highlight how advocates work within the highly restrictive existing system to
eke out benefits for noncitizens seeking safety in the United States.
However, while narrative framing and documenting are important for crafting
legible cases for court, few scholars have focused on the role of time and temporality in
this process. How do advocates respond to, and strategically incorporate, timing concerns
in the process of crafting legal legibility for their clients? As described above, the
immigration court system is characterized by timing considerations that force individuals
to either wait in a queue for years before a hearing or be rushed quickly through the process
without the ability to gather proper evidence or prepare for cases. The experience of timing
is thus a crucial, yet understudied, component to the process of making a case legally
legible in court. Lawyers' work is increasingly complicated by the fact that they find
themselves fashioning clients' claims to align with legal scaffolding that is still being
assembled.
To summarize, studies of temporality in bureaucracies have shown that delayed
time is frequently characterized as a tool of control and regulation by the state, in which
marginalized individuals suffer through the imposition of extended, exhausting, and
demoralizing delays. This practice, scholars argue, is used as a tactic of domination, and
offers few opportunities for marginalized groups to resist or find agency within
bureaucratic temporal regimes. Likewise, based on scholarship that examines how cases
are crafted, we understand, in part, how individuals and intermediaries work within the
legal bureaucracy to make their cases legible to the court or state. This process involves
building narratives of deservingness with sufficient documentation to make myriad,
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idiosyncratic experiences of harm and injustice appear legible within the narrowly defined
law. However, while we know how legal legibility is crafted through narratives and
documentation, we have not yet comprehensively understood the importance of time and
waiting as a component of legal legibility. As time is a key feature of the immigration court
bureaucracy, this article aims to explain the ways that lawyers respond to and strategically
manage time as a strategy and an obstacle. By studying the temporal logics of attorneys in
the bureaucracy of the immigration court, this article contributes to the study of migration
enforcement and bureaucracies, shining light on the interaction between time and law, and
the strategies for managing temporal uncertainty. As the legal field of immigration law is
continuously assembled and reassembled, the importance of time in the highly backlogged
system is crucial. I offer the conceptual framework of legal temporality to help understand
and describe the complex relationship between time and law in the immigration court
bureaucracy and illuminate the divergent strategies for managing it.
Data and Methods
This article is based on ten months of ethnographic observations of detained and
nondetained individual proceedings in the Baltimore immigration court between December
2019 and October 2021,10 and a novel set of 40 in-depth interviews with immigration
attorneys in the Baltimore–DC area. Together, the observations and interviews allow for a
rich understanding of how attorneys and their clients conceptualize time and waiting, while
providing insights into how timing considerations play out in the setting of immigration
court proceedings.
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Includes a period of court closure due to COVID-19, during which time interviews were conducted.
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The Baltimore immigration court is not particularly unique when compared to other
immigration courts in the nation. In 2020, approximately 65 percent of all asylum hearings
in the Baltimore immigration court resulted in an order of removal from a judge, a rate that
is just below the national average of 70 percent. It is a medium-size court in downtown
Baltimore, with seven full-time immigration judges, including one dedicated docket for
detained individuals and one for juveniles. Given the enforcement and migration patterns
in the US, 75 percent of all cases in the Baltimore immigration court in 2020 were from
just four countries (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala). The temporal
conditions of the Baltimore Immigration Court are just slightly above the national average,
with 36,894 pending cases in 2022. On average, Baltimore cases take an average of 1,112
days to be completed (TRAC 2022).
During the study period, my role was that of a court observer. In immigration court,
removal proceedings are open to the public, with the exception of some individual asylum
hearings on sensitive topics. As a formality, I first introduced myself to the attorneys and
judge to get their permission to observe. Although the master and merits hearings are open
to the public, by asking permission to observe and introducing myself I was often able to
ask informal questions of the judge and attorneys, gaining insight into the case. Because
recording devices are not permitted, I wrote jottings by hand during the court hearing. After
leaving the courtroom, I expanded my jottings into more expansive narratives of the
interactions, conversations, and procedures in court. I produced more than 350 typed
single-spaced pages of field notes from my observations in the court.
The interviews, conducted between May 2020 – 2021, were recruited in-person
after hearings, email recruitment from local Baltimore-area attorney email lists, and
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additional snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted by phone and lasted between one
and two hours. With permission, many were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The semistructured topics cover a variety of themes, including attorneys’ personal and employment
history, as well as labor structure, challenges, and identity related to the practice of
immigration law in the Baltimore court. The attorneys interviewed came from both small
and large size private practice and non-profit law firms and represented a range of different
removal defense strategies in immigration court. All the attorneys practice primarily in the
Baltimore immigration court, but occasionally in other courts as well, including Arlington,
York, Philadelphia, and New York.
Using a modified grounded theory and abductive approach to qualitative analysis
(Timmermans and Tavory 2012), I repeatedly returned to my notes throughout the
interviewing and fieldwork process, developing and refining my questions and subsequent
observations in the courtroom. As my fieldwork progressed, I paid increasing attention to
how immigration attorneys managed the labor of removal defense, including political and
bureaucratic changes that reshaped the work of representing immigrants in court. As I reread and coded my data, I kept these themes in mind, searching for evidence that confirmed
or disconfirmed the emerging categories. I coded my fieldnotes using the qualitative
software program Atlas.ti to organize and clarify my findings.
Findings
Legal Temporality in the Court Bureaucracy
The temporal landscape of the immigration court bureaucracy is fundamentally
shaped by backlog, speed-ups, and unpredictable interruptions and ruptures – events that
fragment the experience of removal proceedings for all parties. As the state both produces
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and condemns the backlogged dockets of the immigration court, the conditions of time and
waiting matter a great deal for the lawyers representing noncitizens facing removal. Due
to the constantly shifting, politically responsive nature of immigration law, time affects
removal cases in several ways. First, delayed time (backlog) impacts the strength of legal
cases over time. Second, time shapes how lawyers respond to this landscape by
strategically using time to either expedite cases or slow them down, as policy, precedent,
and presidential administrations change over time. Because the immigration court system
is characterized by an intrinsic instability in the relationship between time and immigration
law, the logics of waiting operate differently for different types of cases. Lawyers
representing cases that are “strong” under existing immigration law, i.e., likely to be
granted relief from removal, might hope for a shorter, expedited timeline in order to allow
respondents a chance to move on with their lives. However, given the legal narrowing of
immigration law, in which fewer and fewer cases have viable options for relief from
removal, a bureaucratic delay might also offer “weak” cases an opportunity to outwait the
law, strengthen case documentation, or earn more money before an eventual removal order.
In the next section, I highlight several examples of how the law fluctuates over time in this
bureaucratic temporal landscape, before diving into the substantive findings section.
First, delays can alter the strength of the legal facts; the case of Ana, a young
Honduran woman seeking asylum, exemplifies this experience. Ana fled Honduras after
experiencing intense abuse at the hands of her ex-partner, a man who was a leader in the
18th Street gang, and she was awaiting her hearing in immigration court in Baltimore. Due
to the backlog, Ana’s case would not be heard for four years. When I spoke with her
attorney, she told me that Ana’s abuser had just been arrested, news that was splashed all
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over Honduran press. Despite the legal difficulty of securing asylum on the grounds on
domestic or gang violence, Ana’s attorney said that her case was strongest right now with
the news of his arrest and wished she could speed up Ana’s hearing. She added that the
delay in Ana’s case would have a negative effect on the outcome:
If there's ever going to be anything would help her case, it would be the news of his
arrest, and the clear evidence that her ex-partner and abuser was not just a gang
member, but a high up one. But that information is going to be stale in the four
years it takes to get in front of a judge. This delay is a bad thing for some people
who have a strong case. My hope is that she gets married to a US citizen, or just
takes the four additional years of American wages [before getting deported],
because I can’t count on this working out in four years.

Given the delayed, extended experience of ‘purgatory’ time, Ana’s attorney’s strategy was
to hope for Ana to find another avenue for relief from removal by marrying a US citizen
or accepting her deportation in four years, despite it being a strong case.
Second, laws can change during the delayed time. The Matter of AB is one example
of how significantly immigration law can change over time as individuals wait for their
day in court. Widely cited as a highly partisan decision, US Attorney General Jeff Sessions
decided Matter of AB in 2018, which governed how asylum law considered claims based
on domestic- and gang-violence. Before Matter of AB was implemented, domestic-violence
victims often had a strong chance of winning asylum in the United States. After its
implementation, judges no longer had the legal option to grant asylum on those grounds. 11
In describing his experience of working as a respondent-side attorney in the Baltimore
immigration court, one immigration attorney described how time matters for his clients:
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The decision has been vacated under AG Garland during the first year of the Biden Administration (US
DOJ 2021).
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We see constant changes in the law over time as cases wait. For a lot of asylum
claims, the rug literally just got pulled out from underneath a lot of these people
with domestic violence or gang violence claims. There was a string of cases early
on, a lot of domestic violence, or gender-based claims. They were coming fast and
furious, and a lot of them were winning – if they were able to get a court date before
2018 when the world changed. That was tough for a lot of those folks, because the
day before they had a good case, and then the day after not so much.
In this interview, the attorney shared how the law can shift across time, remapping legal
viability from one day to the next. In another example, a longtime immigration attorney
described for me how a specific asylum case was reshaped over time:
Before Matter of AB, I had a [domestic violence] case that was a perfect, perfect,
perfect case for asylum. We were waiting for her case to be heard, and I was ready.
I was like “we’re ready to go, we’re going to get it, we’re going to win.” She had a
great case, I mean, this lady couldn’t document more stuff. And then her judge went
on detail [to the border], and her case got pushed back, and it's like, “okay, well...”
So, I called the clerk, and I said, "hey, listen, I understand he's on detail, but can
you move it to another judge?” I really needed to get her case heard. But then the
law changed and the clerk’s like, “I can't move it to another judge. You just have
to wait and see.” So, she got pushed back two years. And now we're two years later
and because of COVID, I don't even know if she's going to get her case heard. She’s
scheduled for October, but I don't know if that's going to happen.
This example demonstrates how temporal changes in the immigration bureaucracy can
change expectations – not only the judge’s detail assignment (a common practice in which
immigration judges will spend several weeks adjudicating cases in busier courts, often
along the US/Mexico border) but also concurrent changes to immigration case law and the
pandemic-related court delay. This was a case in which the attorney had a certain set of
legal facts and an expected timeline, and yet the experience of waiting shattered those
expectations from a logistical and legal perspective. The waiting in this case has significant
consequences – a once “perfect” asylum case wasn’t heard and decided in a timely manner,
and the case fell out of legal viability due to political and legal changes.
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In contrast, when the Biden administration took office in 2021, many immigration
attorneys anticipated changes to the decision of Matter of AB, hoping that the law would
allow victims of domestic and gang violence to seek asylum on those claims. As I observed
in court shortly after Biden took office, many attorneys asked the judges to consider the
stated political interest in reviewing the regulations as they related to asylum claims based
on domestic- and gang-violence. In June 2021, the Biden administration had vacated
Matter of AB in its entirety, allowing for new asylum claims to be made on the grounds of
private actor violence.
Finally, to further exemplify the unstable relationship between time and law, I
highlight the case of Nathaly, a Salvadoran woman seeking a Cancellation of Removal in
immigration court. In a Cancellation of Removal relief application, noncitizen respondents
are required to have 10 years of continuous residence in the United States before being
placed in removal proceedings. Once removal proceedings are initiated with a Notice to
Appear (NTA) from DHS, the ‘clock’ stops, effectively halting the time noncitizens can
accrue towards their relief application eligibility. If, however, the NTA were defective in
some way– does not accurately contain the date and time, as was the case for Nathaly –
case law previously held that the 10-year clock would not be formally stopped, and a
noncitizen respondent could proceed with their petition. Nathaly did proceed and had her
individual hearing before an immigration judge in February 2019. After hearing her
testimony, the immigration judge indicated that he would likely grant cancellation of
removal, convinced that her children would experience extreme and unusual hardship if
their mom was deported to El Salvador.
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Over time, however, Nathaly’s case dropped out of legal viability: due to a DHS
delay in completing a routine background check, the judge withheld his decision, and the
case was delayed until November 2019. During the unexpected delay, the Board of
Immigration Appeals released new case law that “cured” the defective NTA, invalidating
the Nathaly’s 10 years continuous presence, and making her ineligible for Cancellation of
Removal. As her attorney told me:
The judge ruled that my client did not complete the 10 years of continuous presence
in the US that is required for cancellation. We got the decision, and based on that,
we were denied. She had nine years and a couple of months. At the time of the
hearing, we had this [favorable] law, and since the judge didn't make the decision
right away, the new law came which was not in favor to the case of my client.
As these examples show, the legal and temporal uncertainty is incredibly common
throughout the immigration court process. The logics of waiting diverge for different types
of cases, and court actors use different strategies in the unique temporality of this
bureaucracy. For some, the long, backlogged timelines are unbearable, a purgatory that can
damage strong cases. For others, waiting is the best opportunity to buy time in a limited
legal field. Below, I highlight how attorneys and noncitizens 1) experience and 2) manage
the uncertainties of legal temporality by expediting or delaying their cases and illustrate
how and when these strategies come into play.
Logics of Waiting
Expediting
Consistent with existing research on the experience of waiting, the immigration
court backlog can be a ‘purgatory’ for many noncitizens who are waiting to resolve their
cases before a judge. As described above, delays can be particularly detrimental for
stronger cases. With a lengthy, unexpected, wait before removal proceedings, strong
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evidence in a case can become stale and noncitizens can suffer from the anxiety and burden
of not being able to resolve their cases and move on with their lives, including reuniting
with family or participating in civic life. Lawyers frequently talked about “slam dunk”
cases, and the devastation of slow time, being mired in backlog, of not being able to have
those hearings resolved quickly.
In response to the palpable toll that delayed time can have, some attorneys attempt
to speed up time, manipulating the existing backlog to allow cases to resolve, reunite with
family, file for green cards, travel freely, or participate in civic life. One immigration
attorney I spoke with, Michael, told me that he frequently files motions to advance his
cases, hoping to avoid the negative effects of the backlog on his clients. While the
procedural tool of advancing cases is not frequently successful in the court bureaucracy,
some immigration attorneys attempt to reshape their clients’ timeline within immigration
court time using this strategy. Again, the concept of case strength is deeply interwoven
with the conceptualizations of time’s effect on cases. In Michael’s practice, his cases are
primarily East African asylum cases, ones that have particularly favorable odds under
existing immigration law. As he said to me:
In my practice it's very rare that I ask for a continuance. I am one of the attorneys
who files a lot of motions to advance. Most of my clients from East Africa, they
just want to have their asylum approval; they have credible cases, they have strong
cases. It’s not like from some applicants from Latin America. My clients are
confident that they can win their claims, and they get really, really stressed if it's
rescheduled and delayed. I have some clients who've been waiting for five, six
years, delay, delay, delay. It is devastating if you have a strong case, especially if
you have minor kids waiting back home. And a refugee can't... it's just, the pressure
is a lot, to get their family here.
Given the particular strength of his cases, as well as the pressures and expectations from
his clients to reunite with their families, Michael often attempted to circumvent the backlog
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through procedural means. Similarly, another immigration attorney, Gloria, lamented the
backlog, saying that her practice was often in limbo with delayed time. She described how
she attempted to speed up cases using a motion to advance, as a way to ease the
psychological burden to her clients and to the workflow of her firm:
I try to file motions to advance. Most of my clients don't want five years hanging
over their heads, it is a psychological burden on them, and it sucks if we have
hundreds of cases that we can't do anything about that are just waiting and sitting.
Other attorneys in the firm are waiting until at least in 2025 at this point. We have
the evidence, but it’s too early to start preparing them for the hearing, so
sometimes there's nothing else that we can do until the hearing gets closer. I’ve
also tried to file a motion to advance many of the hearings. I have had several get
granted. That’s one strategy.
While not frequently granted, many attorneys attempted to advance their cases
through the backlogged dockets. In one case that I observed in the Baltimore immigration
court, a judge unexpectedly had to leave early for the day. As frequently happens in court,
the afternoon cases were going to be rescheduled, either for months or years out from the
scheduled date. A longtime immigration attorney, John, was representing a client in one of
the afternoon hearings and was already in-person in the courthouse waiting for that judge.
When John found out about the judges’ schedule, he went to that courtroom directly and
asked to be moved up before the judge left for the day. “Rather than risk things changing
on me,” he said, “I’d like to move ahead, judge. It’s a straightforward NACARA case.”
Straightforward, in this case, indicated that it was both a legally strong case and relatively
uncomplicated to adjudicate. The judge considered this request, glanced through the Afile, and agreed that it was a straightforward case. He turned to DHS and asked if they had
any opposition to allowing John’s client’s case to move forward that afternoon and avoid
being further delayed due to the scheduling change. With no opposition from DHS, the
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case was allowed to proceed, and the respondent received a quick approval on their
application.
While detained cases often are processed along faster timelines, immigration
attorneys describe waiting as an excruciating experience in incarceration. Incarceration
significantly limits the legal avenues (i.e. cases are weaker under the law) available to
individuals who are seeking relief from removal. For legally “weak” cases, particularly
those of detained noncitizens, who often are without an attorney to advance their cases (or
any other avenues for relief), many noncitizens attempt to accelerate their own cases by
asking the judge “for an order” of removal without presenting any application for relief.
Rather than wait for another hearing in detention, detainees often requested to be deported
as a strategy to manage delayed time in incarceration. These noncitizens were likely aware
that existing immigration law offered few opportunities for relief to detainees, particularly
those with criminal charges. This strategy offered detained noncitizens the opportunity to
escape the purgatory of delayed time, reasserting some agency in otherwise confining
circumstances. After observing this tactic of speeding up time by asking “for an order,” an
immigration judge suggested to me that this practice of asking for a quick order of removal
would allow the noncitizens to restart their migration journey again after deportation, one
way of manipulating bureaucratic time. However, beyond these strategies of reshaping the
backlogged or delayed time, noncitizens and their attorneys couldn’t do much more than
wait, sometimes for years.
Even in many strong cases, however, attorneys and clients were unable to expedite,
even though they wished to. In the case of Nico, a young gay teenager, asylum law in the
4th circuit near-guaranteed his chance at winning his asylum case. With his strong case, his
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attorney lamented the time delay, saying, “an asylum based on being a gay child is a fairly
strong case. For Nico, it is heartbreaking because he is young, and he wants to go to college.
Getting his asylum and his permanent residency would help him. But now, he's on a fouryear wait. I would speed up his case if I could.” While Nico’s dreams of college were
deferred due to the delayed timeline of the court, for detained cases, the desire to expedite
case processing was even more pressing. The emotional and legal toll of delayed time can
be devastating for all respondents, particularly those who were detained while awaiting
their hearing in immigration court. For many, delayed time represents not just purgatory,
but hell.
Delaying, or Buying Time
In addition to the strategy of expediting, this study finds evidence of a different
temporal strategy being used by the immigration attorneys to manage time in immigration
court. Given the increasingly limited scope of asylum and other removal defense law,
attorneys with weaker cases may attempt to “work the backlog,” by taking advantage of
the existing bureaucratic delays and strategically using continuances. By working the
backlog, lawyers might be able to craft more compelling narratives for clients, gather more
evidence to support their petitions in court, or may benefit from legal changes that make
their cases have a higher chance of being granted relief from removal. Alternatively,
noncitizens can spend the additional delayed time earning money in the United States
before an eventual removal order. Despite the extensive scholarship describing
bureaucratic delay as punishment, this temporal strategy shows how attorneys can leverage
bureaucratic temporality to protect their clients, responding to and managing a delay that
can be unexpectedly advantageous for some noncitizens.
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In immigration court, attorneys frequently requested continuances from the judge
and the DHS attorney, hoping to build a stronger case for their clients, or outwait the
unfavorable legal context. Attorneys often use the procedural process of requesting a
continuance for additional “attorney prep” in order to manage the timeline for their clients.
In the cases of pro se respondents, or those without legal representation, immigration
judges will frequently grant continuances to allow respondents to find an attorney,
effectively buying them more time before their hearing. These legal procedures are
temporary measures that build on the existing backlog to extend the experience of
bureaucratic time even further. One immigration attorney described how delaying time
through continuances was a benefit to her clients, saying:
If a case gets continued, it's often a benefit, so then they can plan accordingly, they
have more time to do this or that. There’s such a low probability of winning an
asylum case. When a case is continued, my clients can take a deep breath, because
they don't have a deportation order. They don't have to extend extra funds for appeal
right now, because the case won’t be heard for maybe three years. It influences their
day-to-day and how they make decisions. With a continuance, we might be able to
get more evidence that maybe we wanted to get before. There are those kinds of
benefits when we have delays. In most cases it's not an issue, and my clients would
prefer to wait.
Another added: “probably 30 or 40% of my cases I couldn’t care less if it ever goes to trial.
If it’s some long shot asylum claim, or there’s criminal issues, you explain to the client
upfront, “look, this is playing the long game here, basically. We’re just working the
backlog.” Immigration law has been strict to asylum cases in recent years, particularly
those from Central America, and many Central American asylum seekers have limited
avenues for relief in the United States. Despite this context, another immigration attorney,
Steve, described how his Central American clients experienced the backlog – not as
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stressful, but as a gift. With more time before deportation, his clients could earn money in
the United States to send back to their families. In these cases, delayed time was a windfall:

There's a huge backlog, but it’s not stressful, it's just the opposite. If the respondent
can get a work permit, they can stay here and work. A lot of these cases are not
winners, and they know it. You can explain to these cases, you're going to lose on
these facts. The ability to file for asylum, albeit a loser, get a work permit, have
these cases strung out for five to seven years, it's like they hit the lottery. A
respondent can make $30,000, $40,000 a year to send home to their family, as
opposed to maybe $1700 or $2000 a year in Guatemala or El Salvador. So, when
they get these cases continued, it's like Christmas. It just buys them time; the
brokenness of the system allows them to buy time.
In referencing the ‘brokenness of the system,’ Steve alludes to the pervasive, years-long
delay in immigration court process as something broken – the system is not functioning as
it was intended. Indeed, there has been widespread criticism of the immigration court
backlog from both right- and left-wing political advocates. However, for attorneys and
noncitizens caught in this experience of extended time, many identify as a silver lining the
possibility of legal changes that might make a case more favorable for asylum, or other
forms of relief in court. In describing his experience of waiting, another attorney said:

We don't mind waiting, especially not here in the 4th Circuit. If we wait, sometimes
we get a great decision from the 4th Circuit, and the judges are able to hear the case
from a new perspective. A big example of that is imputed anti-gang political
opinion. When the 4th Circuit recognized imputed political opinion as a cognizable
asylum claim under a political opinion [Alvarez Lagos v Barr in 2019] the
precedential case transformed our ability to argue asylum cases before the court.
Now, a case where somebody who had been extorted, who had been threatened or
forced to join a gang and fled, might have a viable asylum claim. It opened the
doors to individual claims like that, where nine time[s] out of ten that wouldn’t have
qualified before. Had we had cases that we had heard quickly, like those we had for
those family unit cases, that closes off that possibility. We don't mind the backlog.
Despite the fact that many noncitizens and attorneys seem to find a benefit in extended
time, often adopting a strategy of ‘playing the long game’ in order to take advantage of
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an existing bureaucratic temporal structure, not all experiences of the backlog are
welcome. In particular, noncitizens with legally accordant cases are often stymied by
long delays, as described below. Additionally, one overlooked aspect of ‘playing the long
game’ is that during the process of waiting for a hearing date, noncitizens must continue
to pay to renew their work permits, a timely and expensive bureaucratic process. As one
attorney described: “I have one family who waited five years for their hearing, and when
we went to court, their case was continued another three years. That means they have to
keep paying more than $400 for a work permit every six months. That can be a real
burden, it’s lot of money.” For cases that are delayed, pending on the backlog, or
continued, noncitizens are mired in bureaucratic time, forced to continue supplying
revenue to a bureaucracy that may eventually deport them.
Discussion
The significant backlog in the immigration court is framed as an urgent political
crisis to be solved. Considerable resources have gone into reengineering case processing,
hearing priorities, and the functioning of the immigration court on the ground. One primary
assumption embedded in this “political crisis” is the idea that waiting is foundationally
seen as a problem; both politicians and advocates have long argued that bureaucratic delay
limits access to due process for noncitizens, wastes court resources, and does not
sufficiently (expediently) address the so-called threat of unauthorized migration in the
United States.
Existing scholarship on bureaucratic waiting has largely echoed these assumptions,
arguing that the experience of bureaucratic delay (both for citizens and noncitizens) is
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punishing, exhausting, and demoralizing (Atkinson 2018; Auyero 2011; Griffiths 2014).
However, while much of this research has focused on individual noncitizens’ experiences
of temporality, there has been little focus on how lawyers respond to delayed time as an
obstacle or an opportunity. Given the unique relationship between law and time in the
context of removal proceedings in the United States, there is reason to believe that time
operates differently for different types of removal proceedings. This study aims to
interrogate the prevailing assumptions about time and temporality in this context.
In this article, I have asked a two-part question: first, what is the relationship
between bureaucratic time and legal viability in the immigration court, and second, how
do attorneys manage this temporal landscape? I draw on ten months of ethnographic
observations of detained and nondetained removal proceedings, and 40 in-depth interviews
with immigration attorneys to explore how attorneys and noncitizens experience and
strategically adapt to the temporal regime of the state. I offer the conceptual framework of
legal temporality to better understand the landscape in which attorneys and noncitizens
must navigate the logics of waiting. I find that attorneys and noncitizens often attempt to
strategically expedite or delay proceedings, illuminating how delays imposed by the state
are not always a form of punishment but can often be a benefit for individuals whose cases
don’t align with the limited legal categories of immigration law. Given the pervasive
instability in time and law, waiting is sometimes the best option for noncitizens whose
alternative is deportation.
Empirically and theoretically, this research provides a more robust picture of how
temporality operates with regards to legal status (detention, case strength, citizenship). By
considering how attorneys respond to and manage the bureaucratic backlog, this article
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illustrates how experiences of time vary across case strength, legal and detention status. As
such, the experience of waiting is more nuanced than previously thought. Bureaucratic
delay does exclude those with stronger cases from timely consideration, but a delay (either
by default or as a legal strategy) offers an important opportunity for noncitizens to earn
more money before an eventual removal order, strengthen their cases with additional
documentation, or await a more favorable legal landscape to hear their cases. Attorneys
strategically exploit this delay in order to shield their clients from the temporal harm
imposed by the state.
Additionally, by extending our conceptualizations of time and waiting in
bureaucracies, this article has implications for how to think about the so-called political
crisis of the immigration court backlog. Since many noncitizens experience the
bureaucratic delay as either a reprieve from an inevitable order of removal, or an
opportunity to await more favorable legal conditions, we might look to the punitive and
unstable nature of immigration law as the political crisis, rather than the bureaucratic delay
that is continuously added to by the state itself through political reorganization, and
micromanagement of the court functioning. The possibility of a truly politically
independent immigration court offers a starting point to consider what equity might look
like across different case, and legal contexts. Ahead of this agency overhaul, future
scholarship might consider how time operates for noncitizens in bureaucracies that are
separate from political concerns.
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2. BUREAUCRATIC ENTRENCHMENT: NARRATIVES OF LEGITIMACY
IN A POLITICALLY CONTESTED OCCUPATION
Abstract
In an increasingly polarized political landscape, how do workers in a politically “contested”
occupation justify and legitimize their work in response to political polarization? Drawing
on 40 in-depth interviews with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys
who prosecute immigrant removal cases on behalf of the government, this article examines
their narrative strategies to self-legitimacy. Self-legitimacy is a crucial, yet understudied,
component of the literature on how enforcement officers think about their work. While
existing literature suggests that self-legitimacy is derived in response to public support or
an internal belief in one’s own deservingness to hold power, this article offers a third
pathway, bureaucratic entrenchment, in which these prosecutors draw on a highly
internalized sense of duty to their role and nation to make sense of their work in the face
of heightened public protest and changing administrative priorities. Specifically, I find that
ICE attorneys legitimize their work using several different narrative strategies: 1) a
strongly internalized a sense of duty to existing law (‘just following the law,’ ‘the law is
neutral,’ ‘public servant’), 2) establishing their moral authority as patriotic “white knights”
protecting the nation from threats (‘doing the right thing,’ ‘making the country safer,’
‘unsung heroes,’), and 3) persistent allegations of fraud and criminality to diminish
immigrants’ humanity and claims of persecution for asylum (‘fraud,’ ‘criminals’). In
deploying these narratives of self-legitimacy, ICE prosecutors attempt to resolve perceived
conflicts between their legally mandated job and ethical and reputational criticisms they
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experience. These findings provide an important first step in better understanding the
occupational effects of political polarization for law enforcement agents more broadly.
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We have frequent protests outside our building. We had one of the Occupy movements,
people living in tents outside our building for days. I came into work one morning and
"Fuck ICE" was spray painted on the wall of our building. It's a federal courthouse, mind
you, we are not the only tenants. And it's just like, this is where I work. The negative press
has really taken a toll on us [over the last five years]. We've just been completely vilified.
Current ICE attorney
Introduction
The immigration court system, administered by the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), oversees the legal proceedings of individual noncitizens who
face removal from the United States. While an immigration judge ultimately decides the
outcome of removal proceedings, these cases are prosecuted on behalf of the federal
government by an attorney employed by the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA),
a sub-office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As with other prosecutorial
roles in the US legal system, the prosecutor is employed to zealously defend the interests
of the government under existing law. As such, the role of ICE attorneys is to present the
strongest case on behalf of the government; in the extreme, this is to actively litigate for
the deportation of noncitizens from the United States.
Hyper-visible in recent years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has
experienced multiple partisan challenges to its legitimacy from the public. Similar to other
law enforcement agencies, the federal agency has come under fire as the target of political
protests against immigrant deportation, with widespread calls to ‘defund and abolish ICE.’
Indeed, national polling by Pew Research Center in 2018 found that ICE was one of the
least popular government agencies, albeit along a sharply partisan divide.12 While the left
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The movement gained mainstream traction in mid-2018, with thousands of protests taking place over
several months (Johnson 2021). The poll found that 72% of Democrats hold unfavorable view of the
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has broadly denounced the actions of ICE, the agency has strong support from the majority
of Republican voters and has seen a more than $200 million increase in overall funding
under the centrist Biden administration in 2022 (Reichlin-Melnick 2022). As the agency is
highly politicized – one side calling for efforts to ‘defund and abolish,’ and the other calling
for increased funding and resources for the agency – this article centers the government
prosecutors whose labor is at the center of these ongoing reputational and occupational
tensions. In their role as prosecutorial bureaucrats, these attorneys work as representatives
of the state and perform a legally mandated job, yet little is known about how they manage
the tensions that arise from the politically contested work of immigration law enforcement.
Within the immigration enforcement apparatus, ICE attorneys represent a unique
occupational position, compared with other enforcement agents who also represent the
state. Highly-educated and well-paid, these attorneys are often longtime federal
bureaucrats who have a significant amount of discretion and influence in the courtroom as
prosecutors (Wadhia 2009a). As such, these prosecutors may not have the full power of the
judge to banish or legalize claimants, but their role as an extension of the state is not without
its own power to actively litigate for the removal of immigrant respondents. Additionally,
these attorneys are demographically dissimilar from the field agents for ICE and border
patrol, who are predominantly male and Latino (Vega 2018). Recent agency statistics show
that these ICE attorneys are predominantly White, female, and largely identify as
Democrat/liberal or independent (Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 2022). Given this
empirical case and drawing on the literatures of legitimacy and the social psychology of

agency, while 70% of Republicans were found to have a favorable opinion of the agency (Pew Research
Center 2019).

30

enforcement agents, this study focuses how these prosecutors make sense of and justify
their work in the face of political contestation.13
The study of legitimacy has long been concerned with how the public perceives the
legitimacy of powerholders such as governments, leaders, and law enforcement agents
(Tyler 2003). However, equally important to the framework of legitimacy is how
powerholders themselves understand the work they do, and derive their internalized sense
of self-legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012). A small, but growing, body of work has
begun to illuminate how other types of immigration enforcement agents think about their
work, from front-line police officers (Armenta 2017), border patrol (Cortez 2020b; Vega
2018), to detention officers (Puthoopparambil, Ahlberg, and Bjerneld 2015). From this
important research, we know that field agents find a sense of self-legitimacy from
narratives of moral authority, co-ethnic compassion (Vega 2018), or from a dispassionate
approach to enforcing the law (Bosworth 2019), yet the empirical case of ICE’s prosecutors
has not yet been studied in-depth.
To investigate this, I examine the self-legitimation narratives of ICE attorneys who
litigate immigrant removal cases on behalf of the federal government. Drawing on 40 indepth interviews with ICE attorneys, I identify three primary, co-constitutive narratives of
self-legitimacy, including: 1) a strongly internalized sense of role and duty to existing law,
2) a moral authority as patriotic “white knights” protecting the nation from threats, and 3)
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Due to the heightened nature of the political polarization in this occupational field, I contend that the work
of immigration law enforcement as a form of contested labor. In response to recent calls to investigate the
“villains” of policy rather than the “victims,” and the “actions of those who benefit from the social
construction and political manufacture of immigration crises when none really exist” (Massey 2015:279;
Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006; Prasad 2018; Vega 2018)).
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persistent allegations of immigration fraud, diminishing noncitizens’ humanity and claims
of persecution (for asylum). Taken together, these three occupational narratives that make
up what I term bureaucratic entrenchment, revealing a concerted effort – and source of
self-legitimacy – that ICE prosecutors use to manage tensions in relation to their
occupational role. Bureaucratic entrenchment, I argue, reflects a pathway to self-legitimacy
that involves both an unthinking internalization of duty (Arendt 1964) and political
entrenchment (Levinson and Sachs 2015) in anti-immigrant ideology to insulate against
criticism of the current restrictionist immigration landscape. This approach appears to
provide a salient avenue for relieving some of the tensions of these prosecutors’
occupational self-concept. These findings provide an important first step in better
understanding a new pathway to self-legitimacy, with significant implications for how law
enforcement agencies’ respond to political polarization and criticism.
Literature Review
Legitimacy and Enforcement
In its broadest conceptualization, legitimacy signifies that a legal authority
(politician, law enforcement agent, bureaucrat) acts in accordance with the norms and
values of a group (Max Weber 1978; Zelditch 2001). In studies of law enforcement,
legitimacy has typically been studied as how the public perceives the actions of these
authorities (Tyler 2006).14 However, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) instead argue that
legitimacy arises from negotiation between the public and those who hold power, such as
prosecutors and police officers (Offit 2019). In this negotiation, powerholders make a claim
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Scholars find that the public is more like to support (Tyler 2006), follow (Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško 2014),
and cooperate (Tyler and Fagan 2008) with the law if they perceive the legal authority to be more legitimate.
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to regulate the moral social order, which is either affirmed or denied by the public. As such,
this negotiation requires both the public’s ‘audience legitimacy,’ 15 as well as the equally
important legitimacy derived from officers’ own views on their role, or self-legitimacy.
Several nascent theories have been put forth to explain sources of officers’ sense of
self-legitimacy: public support, or internal deservingness. According to Bottoms and
Tankebe (2012), officers have a fundamental need to believe that they have the legitimate
right to hold power, and self-legitimacy is thus a key pillar of their occupational identity
(Bradford and Quinton 2014). On one hand, self-legitimacy is thought to derive largely
from a sense that the public supports officers’ work (Tankebe and Meško 2015). Scholars
have shown that a significant aspect of self-legitimacy among officers is the belief that
their enforcement occurs within a just legal system, and that officers are carrying out the
neutral application of existing laws (Bradford and Quinton 2014; Jackson et al. 2013). In
the face of public opposition to law enforcement, or negative media portrayals, officers are
said to report a diminished internal sense of legitimacy and moral authority (Nix and Wolfe
2015; Trinkner, Tyler, and Goff 2016)
In contrast, scholars have also identified some officers’ self-legitimacy as
originating from an internal sense of authority, or deservingness to hold power (Barker
2001). In this formulation, the powerholder justifies their authority through a selfassessment that they are uniquely qualified to hold power and authority, even without
validation from the public. Bradford and Quinton argue that “police may gain legitimacy
from the idea that they are different and apart from others in society… police have a legal
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For a broader discussion of audience legitimacy and procedural justice also see (Gau 2014; Sunshine and
Tyler 2003).
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duty, and a right, to enforce the law ‘without fear or favor’ irrespective of public approval”
(2014:1028). For officers in an enforcement system, these two forms of self-legitimacy
construct the work of formal social control as both morally and legally appropriate. Given
the importance of these nascent self-legitimacy pathways, this article aims to link selflegitimacy pathways with what is known about how law enforcement agents and
bureaucrats think about and understand their occupational roles (Tankebe 2010). Given the
uneven moral and political opposition that state agents face, the social psychological
narratives that they use to justify their labor are an understudied, yet crucial, component of
understanding how they legitimize their work.
Social Psychology of Immigration Enforcement Agents
While there is some initial knowledge about how self-legitimacy is constructed, a
closer analysis of the social psychology of other immigration enforcement agents
representing the state helps illuminate the self-legitimacy pathways of ICE prosecutors.
With a widening gap between political directives and public opposition (Ellermann 2005),
there has been an uptick in the number of studies focusing on how immigration agents
make sense of the work they undertake, locating their labor within the institutions for which
they work (Dowling and Inda 2013). As front-line immigration agents grapple with the
dissonance of outside criticism and internal mandates to enforce restrictionist immigration
policy (Bosworth and Kellezi 2017; Ellermann 2009), research outlines several different
social psychological approaches that immigration agents, whether on the border,
overseeing detention centers, or making arrests, use to bridge the legitimacy gap.
First, immigration enforcement agents frequently articulate narratives of rational,
emotional neutrality in which they construct their activities as emotionless, objective, and
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rational (Bosworth 2019; Ugelvik 2016). The process of affect repression is one tool to
ensure the smooth functioning of an emotionally difficult job (Harkin 2015; Waddington
1998). In the case of staff members inside an immigrant detention center, scholars show
that officers take an emotionally neutral or withdrawn stance to do their jobs (Bosworth
2019). Similar findings were shown for front-line police officers who see their role as
objective administrators who are responsible solely for identifying and processing
immigrants for removal, but not responsible for the subsequent removal of those very
immigrants (Armenta 2019). In contrast, some scholars argue that some immigration agents
lean into an affective stance to manage the contested work of immigration policy
implementation. This can range from a perspective of compassion (Vega 2018), guilt at
processing minor arrests as removals, or pride at identifying ‘criminal aliens’ (MaciasRojas 2016).
Second, some immigration field agents employ distancing strategies, from
economic explanations (Cortez 2020b) to extensive paperwork (Borrelli and Lindberg
2019) that attempt to make sense of and legitimize the violence of deportation. Others
attempt to transfer the legitimacy gained from removing socially ‘undesirable’ individuals,
such as terrorists and criminals, to offset their work removing socially ‘deserving’
individuals, such as political activists, or individuals who were brought to the US as
children by their parents (Bigo 2002). Still others take a more wholesale approach to
criminalization (Bosworth and Kaufman 2013; Ugelvik 2016) characterizing all the
immigrants they work with as criminal and dangerous (Bosworth and Turnbull 2015;
Hiemstra 2014) or disputing their morality as criminal and uncertain (Correa 2011; Godsey
2019).
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Given this important work on the self-legitimacy strategies of front-line field agents
and detention center staff, this article interrogates if and how these approaches to
legitimacy operate in the empirical case of immigration prosecutors. While we have a
growing knowledge about how field enforcement agents think about the work they do, less
is known about the self-legitimacy strategies of prosecutorial bureaucrats who wield
coercive force as a function of their prestigious occupations. Therefore, by examining how
enforcement attorneys construct self-legitimacy in removal litigation, we gain a better
understanding of the narrative response of career bureaucrats to political contestation.
The Case: Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) is the legal program for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a sub-agency of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which assumed many of the immigration functions of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after the passage of the Homeland
Security Act in 2002. Through OPLA, more than 1,250 ICE attorneys litigate all removal
proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). OPLA has 25
field offices around the country, with numerous sub-offices; each field office is led by a
Chief Counsel who directs the DHS’ legal representation before the local immigration
courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals. A Deputy Chief Counsel often manages the
team of Assistant Chief Counsels (ACCs), who litigate cases in immigration court. OPLA
also provides legal assistance to the local Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
field offices and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). On the ground, OPLA attorneys
(ACCs) are assigned to a judge each day, rather than being assigned to a particular case. In
this way, cases are effectively randomly assigned to ICE’s trial attorneys in court.
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As an agency, ICE has come under intense public scrutiny in recent years, due to the
aggressive detention and deportation enforcement priorities exercised under the Obama
and Trump administrations, as well as heightened public awareness of the agency’s tactics
through grassroots organizing with the ‘Abolish ICE’ movement. ICE is routinely the
subject of complaints, protests, and lawsuits alleging violations of immigrants’ due process
rights, concerns about enforcement priorities, and widespread outrage and doxing
campaigns over perceived agency directives to separate and detain migrant families. As a
result, the agency has the widest partisan divide in approval ratings by Democrats (28%
view as favorable) and Republicans (77% view as favorable) (Budiman 2020). Today, the
agency is undergoing significant procedural shifts with the Biden administration in office
and develops new enforcement priorities, guidelines, and regulations for the
implementation of immigration policy in the United States. Together, these ongoing
procedural and policy issues pose serious challenges to the legitimacy of the agency, as
well as the self-legitimacy of government attorneys tasked with enforcing the immigration
law and policy.
ICE attorneys, while belonging to a range of political backgrounds, all occupy a relatively
stable, middle-to upper income class position. Demographically, ICE workforce statistics
report that OPLA attorneys are predominantly female, and white.16 In contrast to ICE field
agents, all ICE/OPLA attorneys are licensed attorneys with a juris doctor (JD) degree, or
higher. Hiring occurs after extensive background checks; assistant chief counsels are
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ICE statistics show that the OPLA workforce is 63 percent White, 13 percent Hispanic/Latino, 13 percent
Black, and 10 percent Asian, <3% American Indian/Other), and across all racial categories, about 58
percent female (OPLA 2022).
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usually hired at the GS-14 pay grade, and on average make $100,000-$147,000 per year.
Of those I spoke to, many came to government work soon after law school, some after
completing a law school internship with the Department of Homeland Security or the
Department of Justice. Others came to work for the Department of Homeland Security via
private practice, military, or Border Patrol.
Within a hierarchical management and oversight structure, ICE attorneys have the
opportunity to use their professional and personal discretion (to varying degrees) to
navigate agency priorities to pursue removal in front of an immigration judge. In court,
they have the opportunity to reserve or waive appeal. They also have limited relationships
with other immigration field agents – they advise Enforcement and Removal Operations
(ERO) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) on legal matters, litigate OPLA cases. In
their daily work, ICE attorneys are tasked with reviewing and litigating the removal cases
that they are pursuing. Interviewees report typically spending 4 to 5 days a week, from 8am
to 5pm, in court representing the federal government in front of an immigration judge. In
my sample, I spoke to attorneys at all levels, from headquarters to trial attorneys (described
in greater detail below). As the trial attorneys have the most day-to-day experience
litigating cases in immigration court on behalf of the government, and most positions at
OPLA have experience working as line attorneys, I focus primarily on this experience and
the narratives that emerge from this occupational position.
Data and Methods
This article is based on 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with attorneys in
the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA). I conducted these interviews between
July 2020 – July 2021. I primarily gained access by contacting the Office of Partnership
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and Engagement (OPE) for Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, which facilitated two
rounds of interview recruitment to a nationwide sample of OPLA attorney at multiple levels
within the organizational hierarchy. While I initially snowball sampled out of that network,
I was subsequently informed by OPLA management that I was not authorized to continue
snowball sampling among current ICE/OPLA employees. Additionally, several of my
interview respondents were former ICE/OPLA attorneys, and at the time of interview had
moved on to other jobs with the federal government or in the private sector. These strategies
yielded a sample of 40 interviewees that includes the front-line trial attorneys who litigate
cases in immigration court, supervisory middle management attorneys, and attorneys with
upper management and headquarters. I spoke to individuals in many of the existing field
offices and sub-offices. As Table 2.1 shows, the interview sample is 60 percent female, 70
percent White, 40 percent identified as Democrats, 42.5 percent had worked in the agency
for longer than 10 years, and 55 percent previously held positions as prosecutors in other
legal fields.
[Table 2.1 in appendix]
Interviews were conducted by phone, due to geographic and pandemic-related
restrictions. They lasted between 1-2 hours, and most were audio recorded and transcribed.
Each interview included a discussion of the attorney’s pathway into working for ICE, their
professional identity and experience of litigating immigration cases in immigration court,
workplace conditions in the local OPLA office and immigration court, their experience of
macro conditions affecting immigration case processing (i.e., case volume/backlog,
shifting docket and enforcement priorities, administration turnover), and their reflections
on the agency mission, morale, and politicization of ICE in the public perception.
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Given the contested nature of this occupation, my positionality is an important piece
of understanding these narratives. As a younger, female, politically liberal academic and
outsider, my positionality may indeed have shaped how these attorneys were constructing
their narratives of self-legitimacy in ways that may be different to those they construct for
colleagues. However, I had a sense of rapport and openness from nearly all my
interviewees during our conversations. While many interviewees were somewhat guarded,
even paranoid, at the start of the interview, most warmed up quickly and frequently
expressed considerable enthusiasm at being able to tell “their side of the story.” The
interview gave them the opportunity to narrate their occupational tensions frequently
overlooked in the media, giving voice to myriad occupational frustrations or individual
safety concerns. Indeed, many expressed deep concern for the political backlash the agency
is facing, stating that as a result, they no longer participate on social media, share images
of their children publicly, or even reveal their occupation to neighbors and friends for fear
of criticism, rejection, and safety or doxing concerns. Despite my own personal, political,
and ethical objections to the practice of immigration enforcement and removal, in my role
as a researcher I aimed to listen and report on the work of these bureaucratic prosecutors
as accurately and neutrally as possible.
Data Analysis
The OPLA attorney narratives I document here emerged from three separate rounds
of analytical coding using Atlas.ti. During interviewing, one of the most frequently
occurring themes involved an unprompted justification or explanation of their role in the
process of immigrant removal, often by way of explaining their work within the larger
federal bureaucracy. As described above, ICE attorneys experience multiple challenges to
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their legitimacy — from the social and political critiques in the public sphere to shifting
bureaucratic enforcement priorities that have quickly remapped contours of the work. Both
types of challenges were present in the self-legitimizing narratives deployed by ICE
attorneys, although the shifting bureaucratic challenges became increasingly salient in later
interviews as the Biden administration unrolled significantly altered directives on
enforcement the final months of data collection (May and June 2021). Responding to these
political and social challenges to their occupational legitimacy, ICE attorneys centered
their narratives on an internalized responsibility to the law, while politically entrenching in
an ideology that constructed immigrants as both fraudsters and active threats to the nation.
Given these patterns, I focused on how ICE attorneys experience the heightened
politicization of the agency both bureaucratically and in the public perception, and how
they were personally reconciling these issues. A significant limitation of these narratives
is that I don’t have any additional insight into how they conceptualize immigrants, political
ideology, or occupational identity in other areas – over time, to colleagues or family, at the
voting booth. However, these narratives do represent how they made sense of and justified
the occupational field to me, an outsider to the agency. These attorneys, frequently, are
career bureaucrats who worked for the federal government long before the Trump and
Biden administrations, and the contemporary heightened political divide. These narratives,
then, are informed by an institutional commitment that helps explain why bureaucratic
entrenchment into an internalized role and ideology operates most effectively in the search
for self-legitimacy.
Findings
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In this article, I identify the three primary narratives that ICE attorneys use to justify
and legitimize their labor, including: 1) a strongly internalized a sense of duty to existing
law, 2) a moral authority as patriotic “white knights” protecting the nation from threats,
and 3) persistent allegations of immigration fraud, diminishing noncitizens’ humanity and
claims of persecution for asylum. Taken together, these three occupational narratives make
up what I term bureaucratic entrenchment, revealing a concerted effort, and source of selflegitimacy, that ICE prosecutors use to manage tensions in relation to their occupational
role.
Just Following the Law: Internalizing Bureaucratic Duty
The first narrative used by ICE attorneys to respond to the occupational and reputational
challenges they face is that they are simply ‘following the law.’ This strategy involves
emphasizing the legally mandated role they are employed to do, and articulating removal
litigation as a ‘neutral’ legal process. In this narrative, which was deployed by the majority
of interviewees, ICE agents highlight their role as ‘civil servants’ or “government
bureaucrats” who are just following the law to achieve ‘justice.’ In response to the
implication (in the public perception) that ICE attorneys are actively seeking removal
orders for immigrants, one attorney, who had been working with the agency for more than
10 years, responded by asserting the counter-narrative that their role is simply to execute
the laws “as they are written” and “achieve justice:”
We're not here to give removal orders, I want to make that clear. We're here to
faithfully execute the laws and do what's in the best interest of justice. That's what
we're here to do. That's our main goal. We're not here to give removal orders, that's
not our job. Our job is to faithfully execute the laws and do what's in the best interest
of justice. In doing so, we were able to efficiently process thousands and thousands
of cases. I mean, immigration is highly political, but it really has no role in what
42

we do other than when we're given different policy to follow and that's it. So, for
the most part, we follow the law, and we supplement it with policy (DHS7).
In this description, the ICE attorney denies that his job or removal is political while also
conceding that the field of immigration is highly political, as the real-time policy directives
under the previous Administration were to “pursue removal in all cases.” This selflegitimacy narrative requires the assumption that the law, as written, is “justice” which
allows these removal prosecutors to ethically maintain a commitment to this role,
internalizing the bureaucratic duty to follow the law. Most commonly, this narrative
emerged in response to a discussion of the ongoing challenges to the agency, namely the
heightened politicization and organizational instability of the agency both in the public
perception as well as in the shifting administration priorities on immigration enforcement.
To legitimize their labor and justify their involvement in the project of immigrant removal,
many ICE prosecutors highlighted how little control they had over the policy directives
they face (Arendt 1964). One long-time ICE attorney highlighted the political and social
challenges she perceives, and underscored how, as an ICE employee is simply following
the law to ‘do what I’m told’:
We're civil servants who just go to do a job. As most of us who do this job, we don't
have any say whatsoever on what the people in Washington decide. The president,
the secretary, the director, all of the political positions, I have zero way of directing
any of that. I do what I'm told. And I think that people forget that… I know many
of my colleagues, nobody tells anybody what we do, because we're afraid of,
frankly, being attacked, physically attacked. I mean, also verbally attacked, yes.
But I also don't want someone to come take a swing at me because they don't like
President Trump for president, or Biden did something. I think one [misconception]
of it is not realizing that most people, and I'm not talking about just attorneys, but
even [CBP] agents, that we're civil servants, that we don't make the laws, we don't
make the policies. The way our system works, its civil service system works is by
following legal orders from above. Same as any business. If the CEO says to do
something, you do it or you'll be fired. (DHS36)
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This was repeated by many attorneys, who often infused the narrative with an
individualized assertion that they themselves attempted to act with ‘professionalism,’ or
‘respect and kindness’ in court. This is a tacit acknowledgement that the immigration
system is perceived of as unprofessional and unfair in the public perception and is an
attempt to counteract that ethical concern with personal acts of respect and kindness. In
this case, the narrative strategies enable ICE attorneys to reframe their labor to distance
themselves from the impact of immigrant removal. This was exemplified in one attorney’s
description of the bureaucracy:
We all consider ourselves faithful bureaucratic servants trying our best to execute
the will of whoever happens to be sitting in the chair at the time. Just because we're
doing the job doesn't necessarily mean we sign on with the messenger. I think that
that somehow got lost in the past couple years. I know, it sucks. It sucks being
enemy number one in the public perception. It sucks that I can't tell people where I
work, but I have to come up with some vague answer to any questions they ask,
because I'm very proud of the work we do here and I'm very proud of the people I
work with. I do think that we do really exceptional legal work here, so it's very
frustrating, but it's the world we live in right now. We do what the person in the big
chair in the White House tells us to do. We're government bureaucrats. This is what
we're supposed to do...We took an oath to the constitution and, so long as we're not
violating the constitution, it's our job to be receptive to the orders coming from the
White House. That's how a chain of command works. That's how a government
works. I also have a military background, so that probably also explains why I have
this point of view. It's not personal for us. We're going in, we have a job to do, we
want to be professionals, we are all professionals. We're professionally presenting
our client. It's not because I think your client is a bad person. It's because I don't
think the law grants them relief. I didn't write the law. I get it. I get that it's a sad
case, but that is a case that needs to be taken to Congress, not vilifying the people
that are charged with enforcing the law that Congress wrote. (DHS31)
At the individual level, attorneys attempted to resolve the reputational challenges
individually by emphasizing their own commitment to values of respect and kindness,
while still highlighting how limited their discretion was within the process of immigration
law implementation and enforcement. In the face of heightened politicization and
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widespread critiques of the agency, the narrative of ‘just following the law’ allows ICE
attorneys to gain distance from the practical implications of their enforcement work and
uncritically protect the status quo of their employment.
Other attorneys were less concerned with the narrative of professionalism but
maintained the narrative of distancing and following the law. In the following narrative,
this attorney vehemently and candidly articulates the importance of following the law:
You have sympathetic mom and two kids who come here because El Salvador is a
crap hole or at least big sections of it are. And whether you believe whatever story
she's trying to sell, “my baby daddy beat me up or the gangs were extorting me or
both.” Then the question goes back to what we were talking about a few minutes
ago, you either believe in open borders or you don't. Under the current law, those
kinds of cases aren't good enough for asylum or at least they shouldn't be. So, you're
faced with, again, once we get past the ethics of it, in the sense that my client [the
government] has the case. Then if you are going to do your job, you have to divest
yourself from your thoughts and feelings about immigration law or whatever or
then you couldn't do your job. Because if every time a sympathetic mom and her
two kids comes before you in immigration court, if your knee-jerk reaction is ‘okay,
they've got a standard issue, baby daddy beat me case and they ran to the United
States.’ And she's very sympathetic, she's got a hard-locked story. What are you
going to do? Just roll over and say, “Judge, yeah, she's a very sympathetic person?”
But it's a DV case. And under the current case law, that's a loser. Can we go home
now? And issue removal order. If you don't do that, you're not acting as an attorney.
And therefore, you should get disbarred, in my not so humble opinion. (DHS3)
As a counter example to the to the distancing narrative of ‘just following the law,’ attorneys
also described how, at an individual level, they may even push back, or overstep, existing
law. In these following passages, I highlight how some attorneys don’t rely on a distancing,
law-following narrative but instead highlight their own emotional closeness to certain
cases, even describing how their own decision-making is guided by the question “would I
want this person as my neighbor?” In this example, the attorney even states that she has
her own personally held metrics of when and how to pursue removal, even if the legally
defined characteristic (aggravated felony conviction) isn’t present:
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You just sort of look at: would I want this person as my neighbor? Basically. You
know? Would I want this person as my neighbor? The guy who's driving under the
influence and has been arrested twice, I don't want you as my neighbor. I don't care
if that's not an aggravated felony. I don't want you here. You're not an asset to the
United States. You could kill a bus full of nuns. You know? Or the guy who was
arrested twice for beating his wife in front of his children, but they got over it. …
He took a [domestic violence] program and then the next time around, he took an
anger management program. And then maybe the third time he took an alcohol
program. I don't want you here. You're hurting that mom. You're damaging the
psychological profiles of the children by continually abusing her, having that kind
of house. Not the kind of person that I want in the United States, even though you
don't have any aggravated felony convictions. You know? (DHS12)
In this example, the ICE attorney not only highlights their own personal and emotional
investment in the case but also challenges the adherence to legal standards that dictate the
outcome of removal cases. By stating “you’re not the kind of person that I want in the
United States, even though you don't have any aggravated felony convictions,” this
attorney adopts an approach that operates directly in contrast to the legitimacy narrative of
“just following the law.” However, she attempts to legitimate her position by deferring to
the United States, claiming that “you’re not an asset to the United States,” which follows
with the previously described deference to the law. This type of rogue, moralistic
enforcement approach occurred less frequently, often when the attorneys did not perceive
the law to sufficiently address their moralistic concerns. In contrast, deviation from the
‘just following the law’ legitimacy narrative can also take the form of being a bit more
lenient toward the respondent in the prosecution process:
If I put on my “real person” hat, this person should stay in this country. This person
is just amazing, they are working three jobs raising five kids and sending them to
school and being strong and actually contributing to the American culture and
economy, right? By working all those jobs and supporting the economy from the
bottom level, or some person would be making tortillas by hand, and who wouldn't
want tortillas made by hand? You're great, you should be in America. But then if I
put on my “lawyer” hat, the law is the law. If I don't stand by the law, then who
will? I feel very torn when I have to put my lawyer hat in court and argue to the
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judge. But in [this court], the judges hear my tone and they know I'm not going to
appeal, so then they'll find some way to allow, grant asylum. And we'll just quietly
put that away, even though it's not legally sufficient, the person gets to stay and I
think that's the right thing by that case. But I just feel bad, being a bad lawyer, not
having stood up a hundred percent for the law (DHS33).
In these previous examples, attorneys find self-legitimacy in this contested work through a
highly internalized sense of their bureaucratic role and duty. Although some attorneys did
articulate a desire to overstep the legal standards, most bureaucrats deferred to the rule of
law. This deferential narrative allows ICE attorneys to assert a perception of legitimacy to
their own individual employment and uncritically reinforce the overarching mission of the
agency.
My Job is to Protect People: Establishing Moral Authority Through Patriotic Protection
The second narrative employed by ICE attorneys in their quest for occupational
self-legitimacy is a strategy in which they emphasize their moral authority and the “good”
they are doing, by ‘removing criminals from the US,’ ‘protecting US citizens’ or, in a few
cases, asserting that ICE detention is in fact ‘providing for’ immigrant respondents. In this
narrative, ICE attorneys rely on narrative strategy that includes a variation of ‘we are doing
the right thing’ and ‘making the country safer.’ In these narratives, ICE attorneys first
emphasize their legitimacy through a blend of unchallenged patriotism and what they see
as ‘doing what is best for the United States.’ Occasionally, this involved a narrative of what
Vega (2018) termed ‘caring compassion’ toward immigrants, in which an ICE attorney
legitimized immigration enforcement as net benefit to immigrants. Together, these threads
wove together a self-legitimacy strategy of patriotic protection that emphasizes the
morality of immigration enforcement agents and the agency that employs them. As one
attorney stated:
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I think there is a really big misconception about the detention facilities and how
horrendous the conditions are and how the detainees have no rights, and that could
not be more far from the truth. They get excellent healthcare. They get certain
programs for learning trades and education. They have access to so many resources
to help with their cases. …People don't realize how much these detainees are getting
on the inside all they focused on is the fact that they are detained. Many individuals
this is the first time they've ever seen a doctor in their lives, because they come
from a country where it's not available to them, or the first time they had an oral
hygiene examination and they’re being completely taken care of by the US
government. That is a huge misconception in my mind. (DHS30)
While this narrative contrasts starkly with widespread news coverage and ongoing lawsuits
about the conditions of immigrant detention facilities awaiting removal hearings, this ICE
attorney used this legitimizing narrative to justify the agency’s work and attempt to
reestablish the moral authority of the agency mandate. Despite a few instances of this type
of paternalistic, protective self-legitimation strategy, ICE attorneys more frequently relied
on narratives of nationalistic, anti-immigrant threat ideologies to justify their labor. This
includes protecting the United States from “foreign threats” and keeping American citizens
safe. In many examples, ICE attorneys attempted to establish their own self-legitimacy by
othering immigrants facing removal, saying: “my job is to protect people, protect the
United States, and protect the people who need protecting. My job is to keep those people
from being my neighbor or your neighbor.” (DHS12). In this statement, the attorney
highlights her moral authority by emphasizing her role as a protector. In another example,
an attorney articulated how he saw the goal of the agency and the attorneys from a narrative
of patriotic protection – assuring the security of the nation – in which immigrants,
regardless of criminal background, are cast as threats to the nation:
The primary goal of our attorneys is protecting our community, protecting our
country from the harms that could come our way, or that are already here. And our
commitment to the security of our nation is unwavering. And I've seen it throughout
our organization... The amount of work that they put in to make sure that somebody
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who's not a citizen of this country, who's been convicted of a heinous crime against
a child, is removed and is no longer a threat to our community. We see threats. We
are motivated to make sure those threats don't actually make it into the country, and
to protect folks from harm, because we see those threats. We've continued to see
that throughout the years, that there's a lot of folks who want to come here, who
don't subscribe or believe overall what the US is all about... And no matter how
much root beer you give them, they're not going to buy what we stand for. And they
intend on doing some harm. (DHS7)
However, most often this narrative hinged on conceptualizations of immigrants as criminal
threats, mirroring the political rhetoric in recent years. Another attorney described the
satisfaction he derived in removing criminals from the United States, legitimizing his work
through his sense of satisfaction at saying “you’re going back to your country”:
I have a story about a child molester, and I really took great satisfaction in removing
him, saying: “No, you're going back to your country. You're not going to come do
bad things to our children anymore. You're going to stay in your country.” So that
sort of thing, keeping the bad guys out, in a very simple aspect, I really take
satisfaction in that. Guys who have done criminal acts, criminal behaviors, drug
dealers, human rights abusers, like I said, crimes of violence again children, against
people, human trafficking, that sort of thing. There are just some really awful things
that people do to each other; I like it when bad people get their just desserts. I like
it when you're like, “No, no, you've done bad stuff. You don't get to play. Sorry.”
(DHS39)
Despite evidence that the majority of cases in immigration court are for individuals without
criminal convictions (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 2022), ICE attorneys
frequently underscored the criminal aspect of immigration cases, justifying their work
through the perceived importance of removing “criminals” from the United States.
I'm going to hold you accountable for our laws and the laws that you broke, and
you're not just going to stay in the United States. You have to leave and go
elsewhere. You don't get to enjoy the privileges and benefits of living in the United
States." The bad people don't stay here, they don't get to avail themselves of the
greatness that this country has to offer. We're very much tasked with ensuring that
the people who are allowed to come to the US are people who lawmakers have
decided should be here, like asylum seekers… is that really in the best interest of
the United States to have people who have a rap sheet two miles long? Somebody
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who's molested a child, but I don't think that's in the best interest of the United
States to keep them here. (DHS36)
Frequently, as seen above in the statement “they don't get to avail themselves of the
greatness that this country has to offer,” this narrative is infused with an implicit protective
patriotism and explicit nationalistic sentiment. In many ways, these individual-level
strategies of legitimating their work, of infusing their daily law enforcement tasks with
meaning, take on the same rhetorical justifications used by the agency overall, often as
protectors of the country, to remove criminal threats. In the following example, the attorney
highlighted that he saw individuals with sexual offense convictions as important removal
priorities and offered the assumption that “most people would agree” that these individuals
ought to be removed from the country:
Yeah, I mean, for me, I always try to keep, it maybe sounds kind of silly, but I really
do try to think of what is the right thing for the United States? …The cases I was
talking about before, where you've got convicted sex offenders. I mean, if there was
any case that I sort of cut my teeth on and made my name on, it was sexual offense
cases. And those are the ones that I devoted a lot of my attention to. Those are the
ones that I can point to as being, I think, most people would agree with those, if
there's any case that are important, those are the cases that are important. And I try
to use that as sort of my guidepost. (DHS9)
In this legitimizing strategy, there is a near-complete conflation between removability and
the dehumanizing narrative of criminal behavior. Without acknowledging the socially and
politically constructed nature of removability charges (indeed, the list of aggravated
felonies for which one is inadmissible, and automatically barred from seeking most forms
of relief has grown exponentially in recent years (Chacon 2009), ICE attorneys establish
their own legal and moral authority within their occupational mandates.
Asylum is Four Hours of Unmitigated Perjury: Disputing Respondents’ Claims and
Humanity
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Another legitimizing narrative frequently deployed by ICE attorneys was to allege
the fraudulence of noncitizens’ claims or assert their criminality, as an attempt to dispute
the respondents’ humanity and moral standing. This narrative of legitimacy implicitly
served to justify the labor of the attorneys, by emphasizing the “undeserving” nature of the
claims in immigration court. The first way in which ICE attorneys dispute the respondents’
claims was through alleging that most immigrant respondent claims were fraudulent, and
therefore illegitimate and unlawful. Nearly every ICE attorney referenced the presence of
fraud in immigration cases, describing it as one of the most significant challenges in this
work: “fraud is rampant within immigration, and for every 10 legitimate claims, you'll get
100 people pretending to be that person. It’s a way to stay in the country” (DHS6). From
an even more cynical perspective, another ICE attorney told me that “if you want to
describe an asylum hearing, it's pretty much four hours of unmitigated perjury.” (DHS37).
Others describe fraud in more vivid detail, elaborating on what they perceive to be unlawful
manipulations of existing immigration law to garner favorable outcomes:
We had a situation probably five years ago, where a judge had a case of a Jamaican
[man] who claimed that he was homosexual and claimed that he had been beaten
in Jamaica by people that hated homosexuals. So, we looked at it and we did the
best research that we could find. And sure enough, it's not a good environment in
Jamaica for homosexuals. It's probably not at the level of persecution, but there is
some discrimination that happens there with homosexuals. About a week or two
later, the judge granted relief, ordered the respondent released, and the person went
on with his life. Probably about a month after that, we started seeing that of the
detained Jamaicans, there were now five homosexual Jamaicans. Three or four of
them were married to women, but they were identifying as homosexual. How do
you prove somebody is homosexual or not homosexual? Well, you go forward
another month, literally every Jamaican in the detention facility was now
homosexual. We were fighting it and then weirdly enough, a letter gets sent to the
judge that was from somebody there that says, “Judge, you're an idiot. None of
these guys are gay.” (DHS9)
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In this example, the ICE attorney highlights a pattern he perceives in which respondents
will fraudulently shift their claims to align with successful petitions in immigration court.
In this example, his office is diligently “fighting” such claims, creating a sense of
legitimacy to the work he and the agency are undertaking. Another attorney described the
experience of seeing claims embellished, describing what she sees as her work in “tearing
people’s credibility apart” while claiming that adverse credibility determinations from
immigration judges have risen in recent years:
I feel that when people talk about immigration, we talk like ‘it's this poor person
who's being persecuted abroad and all of this.’ And that's not as common as what
people think. There are many cases where we tear apart people's credibility and I’ve
gotten many people, unfortunately, to admit on the stand, “yeah I made it all up.
I'm here to work. I want to make money.” Or they take something that truly did
happen to them, but then they embellish it so much that it's this is a total
hypothetical, but the person's father beat them when they were seven and they're
now 27 and nothing has happened since then…People think every single person
coming here faces a terrible story and meets all the requirements for asylum and
that's not the truth. The vast majority of them don't meet that. And I'm not saying
that I don't sympathize with people in Central America where they don't have a lot
of money, they're really coming here and make more money. I get it. Unfortunately,
our laws and our government have said that's not sufficient. And what happens is
they start making stuff up. The number of adverse credibility determinations that
we've gotten has grown exponentially in the last 10 years. (DHS36)
In this narrative, this ICE attorney reestablishes her own legitimacy by first justifying the
work – the times when respondents have admitted to making up or embellishing their
claims in court, second by deferring to the immigration law which narrowly defines asylum
eligibility and has increased adverse credibility determinations, and third, reestablishing
her own morality by stating that she can “sympathize” with people in Central America.
This entrenchment into the bureaucratic rule of law is a salient way for this attorney to
claim that his work is both morally appropriate and legally just.
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Within the broader narrative in which ICE attorneys dispute the claims of
immigrant respondents, ICE attorneys established their legitimacy by identifying
respondents as criminal and undeserving. Similar to the narratives of fraud, ICE attorneys
relied on narratives of criminality to discredit respondents, arguing that the immigrant
respondents seeking relief from removal are not “innocent” or deserving of relief. Such a
claim allows ICE attorneys to morally justify their own labor and that of the agency:
I think the misconception is the people coming in are completely innocent and just
want a better life for their families, and that they're asylum seekers. I'd say the vast
majority do not qualify for asylum. Being extorted by criminals, that's a criminal
offense: you were criminalized in your home country, it doesn't mean you were
persecuted because of your race, religion, national origin, political opinion and so
forth. I think people are really misled on what is asylum. These aren't asylum
seekers, they're economic migrants. When they get here, they all talk and they know
how to get around the system. Their kids, of course, they receive the free schooling,
they get free healthcare, they know not to put their husband's income on the thing,
so they qualify for more relief. They don't pay taxes, they all get paid under the
table. And they know how to work the system. Then when they go to commit
crimes, you see this over and over in all the jurisdictions I worked, they will give
them more lenient sentences than United States citizens so we cannot remove them.
Instead of convicting them of a felony offense they will give them 364 days in jail
[so we can remove them], they'll drop down their conviction to some sort of
disorderly conduct instead of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon so we can't
remove them. The judges really go out of their way to help them. So, we're not
totally dealing with innocent people all the time, I think that's a big misconception
of the public and they just don't get the full facts of their criminal stuff and things
of that nature. (DHS40)
By seeing immigrant respondents as fraudulent and criminals, ICE attorneys normatively
justify the labor of removal in which they are participating, legitimizing their own work,
and implicitly bolstering the agency’s mandate. Similarly, another attorney described this
legitimation strategy through an assertive criminalization of immigrant respondents:
I don't think people see or know is that we have so many cases that are serious
criminals. Can't we all agree that the child rapists should be removed from the
United States, because we do a lot of that. Same for the terrorists, can we agree that
the terrorist shouldn't stay? So, it's just frustrating because I think people don't know
53

that our cases aren't just these sympathetic, and I have sympathy for people too. I'm
not, like, not human. So, there are cases that nobody really wants to focus on or feel
good about, but then there's a lot of cases that we do feel really good about. I don't
think people know that we do all this other stuff. In immigration court, I had many
cases come across my desk with people that were murderers, had tried to commit
gang hits, were drug traffickers, had five, six, seven-time instances of spousal
abuse. When you can use the tools at your disposal to make sure individuals that
are violent and dangerous are taken off the streets and removed from the country,
that's typically something that I think folks feel good about. (DHS35)
While the legitimizing strategy of disputing respondents’ claims and morality was used by
many attorneys, I highlight here a contrasting legitimizing narrative in which several
attorneys emphasized the human aspect of these court claims by highlighting limitations of
immigration law itself. By pointing to the limitations of the law and policy, some ICE
agents humanized the respondents in court, while still deferring to the law. One attorney
said:
You could deserve all the relief in the world, but if it's not provided for under the
law, there is nothing I can do about it. Despite, again, what sometimes people think.
And so, to me, actually those are the hardest cases, where you see just truly
sympathetic cases, and there's no relief, and there's nothing you can do about it.
(DHS11)
In this narrative of self-legitimacy, ICE attorneys attempt to establish their own legitimacy
by pointing to what they perceive as legitimate and justifiable reasons to pursue deportation
in immigration cases. By focusing on instances of fraud and criminality, ICE attorneys
dispute the morality and sufficiency of the respondents’ claims in court, thereby
reestablishing the need for their own occupational labor as bureaucrats following the law.
Discussion
In a time of heightened polarization of immigration policy in the United States, this
article examines the self-legitimacy narratives of ICE attorneys who litigate immigrant
removal cases on behalf of the federal government. In it, I ask: how do enforcement
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bureaucrats make sense of their labor when faced with uneven public support? Drawing on
40 in-depth interviews with ICE attorneys, I identify three primary, co-constitutive
narratives of self-legitimacy, including: 1) a strongly internalized a sense of role and duty
to existing law, 2) a moral authority as patriotic “white knights” protecting the nation from
threats, and 3) persistent allegations of immigration fraud, diminishing noncitizens’
humanity and claims of persecution (for asylum). Taken together, these three occupational
narratives that make up what I term bureaucratic entrenchment, revealing the social
psychology – and source of self-legitimacy – that ICE prosecutors use to manage tensions
in relation to their occupational role. By extending the literatures on legitimacy and the
social psychology of enforcement officers, bureaucratic entrenchment offers a new
pathway of self-legitimacy that involves a high degree of role internalization (Arendt 1964)
and political entrenchment (Levinson and Sachs 2015) in anti-immigrant ideology to
insulate against criticism of the current restrictionist immigration landscape. By
constructing individual-level narratives about their political and legal neutrality,
establishing their own moral superiority as heroic and patriotic protectors of the United
States, and doubling down on disputing the claims of the immigrants facing removal, this
approach offers a clear avenue for relieving some of the tensions of these prosecutors’
occupational self-concept.
These findings provide an important first step in better understanding a new
pathway to self-legitimacy, with significant implications for how law enforcement
agencies’ respond to political polarization and criticism. In deploying these narratives of
self-legitimacy, this case shows that in addition to traditional pathways to self-legitimacy
through public support and individually held beliefs in one’s own superiority to exercise
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power, actors in politically contested occupations may entrench politically, as a means of
justifying their continued labor. As ICE attorneys attempt to resolve conflicts between the
perceived ethical and reputational concerns they experience through their work, it is a third
pathway, that of political entrenchment in nationalistic, protectionist sentiment, rather than
responsiveness to public protest, that appears to provide the clearest avenue for selflegitimacy and management of one’s occupational self-image. These findings provide an
important first step in better understanding the occupational effects of political polarization
for law enforcement agents.
These findings suggest that one possible consequence of intensified political
polarization is that agents working in these fields may find it necessary to become
bureaucratically entrenched to see their work as legitimate. In this case, entrenchment
operates through distancing themselves from the impact of their deportation, valorizing
their own efforts, and dehumanizing the individuals they are deporting. Moreover, rather
than demonstrating a positive responsiveness to public protest and shifting administration
priorities, the most salient self-legitimation narratives among ICE attorneys – irrespective
of geographical location, length of time in the agency, seniority, gender, age, or political
affiliation – were narratives that reinforced a distanced disregard for such protest/change,
a strong nationalistic protector-savior mentality toward US citizens, and persistently
alleging immigrant criminality and fraud, despite widespread data to the contrary. By
overwhelmingly identifying immigrants as criminals and fraudsters and positioning
themselves as heroes, ICE attorneys can uncritically continue the work of removal, even
under conditions of public protest and delegitimizing political shifts.
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Future research might investigate how narratives about self-legitimacy and stigmamanagement operate for other politically dirty workers, particularly in cases where the
salience of political polarization has increased dramatically in recent years, such as for
front-line police officers. While the case of ICE attorneys provides an important lens into
the functioning of immigration law enforcement, it would be important to analyze if similar
patterns of political entrenchment hold for both street-level police forces and criminal
prosecutors. How do social movements such as ‘all lives matter’ and ‘back the blue’ reflect
similar strains of political entrenchment, and to what degree do these self-legitimacy
narratives vary at different educational and occupational prestige levels? Importantly, these
narratives extend our knowledge of how self-legitimacy and social psychology operate
hand-in-hand in conditions of politically contested work. These findings suggest that, in
addition to existing pathways to self-legitimacy (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999),
entrenchment in existing bureaucratic roles provide an important avenue to insulate against
public criticism and build internal and organizational self-legitimacy. These selflegitimacy narratives of ICE attorneys, then, reflect a pathway that involves relying on
patriotic ideologies and anti-immigrant narratives to bolster one’s own occupational value.
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3. JUDGES AS SUBJECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION STATE:
MICROMANAGEMENT, PRECARITY, AND THE LABOR OF
REMOVAL
Abstract
The state plays a key role in managing migration, and immigration judges in the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) are central actors in this process. While
immigration judges are independent decision-makers under the statute, they occupy a
unique position in the U.S. legal system as employees of the Department of Justice and
extensions of the state in immigration enforcement apparatus. This tension is apparent
when the Executive branch imposes politicized directives into the functioning of the
immigration court; EOIR management has imposed several changes into the working
conditions of immigration judges, including 1) shifting political priorities for case
processing and 2) increasing the speed at which judges must complete cases through
performance metrics. Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews conducted with current and
former immigration judges, this article charts how these changes impact the labor of
adjudication, finding that judges experience significant tensions in this work, including
increased bureaucratic inefficiency, reduced independence and docket control, and limited
preparation time for immigrant respondents appearing before them in court. As these
managerial changes occur from the top down, I offer the micromanagement of migration
as a conceptual link between street- and state-level migration control, complicating
previous conceptualizations of judicial independence and decision-making. I argue that the
state's management of immigration judges increases precarity among noncitizens in the
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immigration court system, and operates as a different form of migration control, distinct
from macro-level border policy or front-line decision-making of street-level bureaucrats.
Due to the contingent nature of judicial independence within the court bureaucracy within
the Executive branch, the micromanagement of immigration judges reveals the banal ways
that the state controls both adjudicators and noncitizens within a broader trajectory of
contemporary punitive immigration policy.
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Under the law, immigration judges have the authority to use their discretion.
Yet, there are efforts on the part of the administration to reduce the ability of the judges –
through performance metrics, through disciplinary action, through complaint
procedures, through removing cases from their docket if the administration isn't happy
with what the result is going to be, through keeping them from being able to speak and
communicate and inhibiting their ability to train the next generation of lawyers through
participating on substantive panels. If you curtail judges’ ability to do all of this, you are
violating not only their independence, but you are rendering ineffective what the judges
are authorized by law to do, which is ensure that due process is provided to all the
parties that appear before the judge.
Immigration Judge and NAIJ Union Member
Introduction
Despite being highly polarized, how immigration law is implemented is critical –
each decision by an immigration judge has enormous consequences for the lives of
noncitizens, while the collective decision-making of immigration judges reshapes the
composition of the U.S. population. Immigration judges are tasked with the challenging
role of maintaining the nation’s symbolic and physical borders and providing legal
protection to noncitizens fleeing persecution, all from a highly irregular position within the
American adversarial legal tradition.17 Deciding thousands of immigrant removal cases
every year, immigration judges “exercise their independent judgement and discretion” (8
C.F.R. § 1003.10 n.d.), and yet are employed by and answer to the U.S. Attorney General
in the Department of Justice. This unique tension in judicial independence has been widely
criticized by immigration court advocates (Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges
2020), and subject to numerous calls to shift the practice of immigration adjudication into

17
Unlike United States District and Supreme Court judges, who maintain the highest degree of judicial
independence, the authority of an immigration judge is not derived from Article I or III of the Constitution
and the Judicial Branch. Instead, immigration judges are quasi-Administrative Law judges whose authority
is delegated through the Attorney General and the Executive Branch.
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the judiciary (NAIJ 2022). However, less is known about how immigration judges
experience this tension day-to-day. By focusing on the hard-to-reach population of
immigration judges, this study makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to
sociological literature on state migration control and street-level bureaucracy.
Within a long trajectory of research examining how states manage migration,
scholars have focused on the ways that states engage in macro-level strategies, including
remote border control (Zolberg 1997) and other tools of repulsion (FitzGerald 2020) and
restriction (Massey and Pren 2012). At the same time, as the field of immigration control
has increasingly shifted to local-level enforcement (Armenta and Alvarez 2017; Coleman
2007), scholars have looked to the street-level implementation of immigration law and
policy, with a focus on the uneven ways that state and non-state actors reshape migration
control on the ground as street-level bureaucrats (Asad 2019; Shiff 2021). While there has
been some examination of the structural constraints shaping the labor of migration control
(Cortez 2020a), few scholars have looked at the labor and working conditions of
immigration judges within the bureaucracy (Stuart L Lustig et al. 2008). Instead, the topic
of judicial working conditions has gained traction in popular and public forums, from
congressional hearings on judicial independence (U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee 2022) to news reports of judge burnout and resignations (Alvarez 2019).
Given the unique occupational position of immigration judges within this legalbureaucratic structure, I ask: first, how do immigration judges experience their labor within
this management system, and second, what are the consequences of the management of
their labor to the process of removal adjudication? To answer this question, I rely on 30 indepth interviews with current and former immigration judges that focus on their
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experiences of the labor of removal, the EOIR management structure, their employment
history, and affective experiences of this work. Using these labor narratives, I show that
immigration judges are subject to managerial directives that reshape the process of
immigration adjudication. I identify three primary managerial tactics that immigration
judges experience most saliently, including: 1) shifting priorities, 2) increasing speed, and
3) isolation, all of which have significant implications for the decisional outcomes of
removal proceedings in immigration court.
This work process is illustrated by what I term the micromanagement of migration,
a concept that links the research on street-level bureaucracy and how states manage
migration. Due to the dependent position of the court bureaucracy within the Executive
branch, the micromanagement of immigration judges reveals the banal ways that the state
disadvantages both adjudicators and noncitizens within a broader trajectory of
contemporary punitive immigration policy. The theoretical aim of this paper extends
beyond a description of judicial working conditions. I use the case of judicial working
conditions to analyze how labor management operates as a different form of migration
control, distinct from macro-level border policy or front-line decision-making of streetlevel bureaucrats. By analyzing the changing nature of judicial work as a managerial tactic
of control, this study contributes to literatures on state- and street-level processes of
migration control, while clarifying the process of immigration adjudication more broadly.
My findings also have implications for the study of labor and management, adding to
existing discussions of the micromanagement of white collar-workers.
Background: History of Immigration Adjudication
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The practice of federal immigration adjudication has roots dating back to the early
nineteenth century with a two-tiered system for hearing immigration cases, in which cases
under the Chinese Exclusion Act were heard in federal courts, while all other nationality
groups were heard through non-judicial administrative proceedings (Hester 2017).
Following United States v. Wong You (1912), these cases were merged and eventually all
heard by the newly created Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) in the Justice
Department that enforced racialized immigration exclusions (Ngai 2004). At that time, INS
immigration enforcement was conducted by “hearing officers” with mixed duties of
presiding over cases they were also enforcing (Rawitz 1988). Despite a 1950 holding from
the Supreme Court requiring separation between enforcement and adjudication under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) in 1952, superseding the APA and largely preserving the role of INS officers as
dual enforcers and adjudicators, referred to as ‘special inquiry officers’ (SIOs). This
practice slowly began shifting in the 1960s, when non-SIOs began taking on the tasks of
presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses, and SIOs focused solely on
adjudicating immigration cases for the INS.
Since the 1980s, there have been numerous modest reforms to the structure of
immigration enforcement and adjudication, despite an increasingly punitive turn in
substantive immigration policy. In 1983, the Department of Justice (DOJ) created the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), separating immigration adjudicators
from INS and placing them under the direction of the Attorney General in the Executive
Branch. In 1996, Congress amended the INA to use the term “immigration judge” for
adjudicators, while simultaneously introducing a new phase of immigration restriction
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through the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA). The IIRIRA broadly reshaped immigration adjudication, expanding the
categories for deportable offenses, restricting opportunities for relief from removal, and
limiting judicial review for immigration judges (Wadhia 2009b). After the 9/11 attacks, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 to bolster enforcement
operations; today, DHS serves as the sole prosecutor for immigration cases on behalf of
the federal government, while EOIR continues to adjudicate from within the Department
of Justice. In EOIR courtrooms around the country, immigration judges determine the
removability and applications for relief for the noncitizen. If there is a relief application
filed, the judge will determine whether to grant it, or order the removal of the noncitizen.
Contemporary Structure of Immigration Courts
In the United States, the bureaucratic supervisory system for immigration judges
differs significantly from traditional judges and adjudicators in other agencies. Judges are
employed in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, located in the Department of
Justice in the Executive branch. In the approximately 60 courts and hearing locations
around the country, immigration judges are directly managed by an Assistant Chief
Immigration Judge (ACIJ), often referred to as a “manager” by the judges. Many courts
have an on-site ACIJ, while some smaller courts have an off-site, remote ACIJ who
manages all the hearing locations in the area of responsibility. ACIJs supervise the daily
work of the judges and respond to complaints and issues within the area of responsibility.
The ACIJs are in turn supervised by two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges and one
Principal Deputy Chief Immigration Judge, who both report to a Chief Immigration Judge.
The Chief Immigration Judge reports to the Deputy Director and Director of EOIR, who
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reports to the Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General. This structure is represented
in Figure 3.1.
[Figure 3.1 in appendix]

All immigration judges are career attorneys with a juris doctor (JD) degree or
higher, and occupy a stable, upper income class position earning between $120,000 –
$182,000 per year, according to federal employment statistics (EOIR 2020). However,
despite the name ‘judge’ and the black judicial robes, immigration judges are neither hired
nor afforded the same protections as Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) (Jain 2018).
Unlike traditional ALJ hiring, immigration judge candidates are instead recommended
through EOIR to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and then appointed to the
position by the U.S. Attorney General. This hiring process has been criticized for being
highly partisan and was subject to a congressional investigation under the second Bush
administration. During the investigation, it was found that both the White House and the
Department of Justice had “treated the hiring of immigration judges like other political
appointments,” favoring political party members for appointment and reshaping the
political leanings of the judge pool. Once hired by DOJ, immigration judges are subject to
a probationary period of two years during which time they can be removed or terminated
without a cause or review. New judges have limited opportunities for training and have
been subject to ongoing performance metrics since 2006, including the highly controversial
2018 quantitative performance metrics mandating 700 annual case completions. Judges can
be reassigned or rated down by the agency for low productivity and job performance, a
workplace precarity that traditional ALJs don’t experience.
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The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) has served as the
representative of the judges’ collective bargaining unit since 1979 (NAIJ 2022). In 2019,
the DOJ under then-President Trump petitioned the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) to decertify the NAIJ, which was granted in 2020. This decertification effort was
later reversed by the Biden DOJ in December 2021. However, in late January 2022, the
FLRA rejected a request from both EOIR and NAIJ to throw out its controversial
November 2020 decision that decertified the union. In response, NAIJ president and New
York immigration judge Mimi Tsankov said “This is a poorly reasoned decision and
overrules the will of the parties. It is rooted in the majority FLRA board members’ antiunion bent and reflects a deep desire to silence immigration judges” (AFL-CIO 2022).
Among the chief concerns for IJs, NAIJ highlights issues related to due process, judicial
independence, limited funding and resources, and a skyrocketing backlog of cases on the
docket. Additionally, judges report high levels of stress, burnout, and turnover (Stuart L.
Lustig et al. 2008), and are currently barred from speaking to the press or public in any
capacity (Atkins 2020). There have been widespread calls for an Article I immigration
court, which would protect the independent decision-making of immigration judges by
moving them into the judiciary and out of the executive branch (National Association of
Immigration Judges 2020).
Immigration Judges as Street-Level Bureaucrats
As Weber has argued, the modern state holds a monopoly on the use of legitimate
coercion within a given territory (1978), including the restriction of migration across the
borders of sovereign states (Joppke 1999; Torpey 1999). Nation-states, with the capacity
to deny entry and residence to certain noncitizens have historically attempted to control
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their borders through a system of ‘remote border control,’ the transnational system of visas
and passenger screening that has been in operation since the nineteenth century (Zolberg
1997). In managing immigration in the United States, the state leverages its monopolistic
coercive capacity most notably through the practices of detention and deportation, which
have become the primary mechanisms for the state to regulate noncitizens in recent decades
(García Hernández 2015; Stumpf 2006). In recent years, the process of migration control
has expanded to include a vast interior system of immigration enforcement agents, both
federal and non-federal employees, who work to apprehend, detain, and remove
noncitizens.
In this concentrated phase of interior immigration enforcement, there has been an
uptick in research that analyzes how immigration agents do their work, locating their labor
within the federal agencies for which they work (Wissink and Oorschot 2020). This process
has also been described in the European context, in which the nation-state has called in
local level officers and street-level bureaucrats to monitor immigration (Ellermann 2009;
Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). This work has revealed a complex system of on-the-ground
practices showing how street-level immigration officers implement the state’s immigration
law and policy (Armenta 2012; Vega 2018). In studying the front lines of border patrol
(Cortez 2020; Vega 2018), policing (Armenta 2017), detention centers (Bosworth 2019),
asylum offices (Shiff 2021), scholars have alternately conceptualized front-line
immigration agents as either extensions of the state or as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky
2010), the semi-autonomous workers whose uneven micro-level decision-making reshapes
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policy-in-action.18 On one hand, immigration enforcement agents act as extensions of the
state: objective administrators who are responsible for identifying and processing
immigrants for removal at the direction of federal agencies, while on the other hand
immigration agents take a more uneven approach to applying the law.
Building on these findings, I look to the complex position of immigration judges:
in occupational identity and by statute, immigration judges are independent decisionmakers, yet they are also employees of the federal immigration state, subject to sanction
and dismissal. Overwhelmingly, scholars have previously described immigration judges as
‘street-level bureaucrats’ due to their discretionary capacity in making immigration-related
decisions (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag 2007). Scholars have argued that
judges, with the authority to banish or legalize claimants, have enormous power to “make
policy” in the courtroom. In a growing body of work that interrogates the role of bias in
the decision-making of immigration judges, scholars have shown that judges’ personal
characteristics significantly impact on decision-making, finding that the chance of winning
asylum is strongly impacted by the immigration judges’ gender, political orientation (Kim
and Semet 2020), prior work experience (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007), attitudes towards
immigrant groups (Rottman, Fariss, and Poe 2009), and values relating to family or
Americanization (Farrell-Bryan 2022; Marouf 2011).
However, despite such findings, there has been altogether less attention on the
structural context in which immigration judges make their decisions. Indeed, the structural

18
These frontline workers have a high degree of discretionary capacity as they make decisions to enforce
policy (Asad 2019; Heimer 2008), and thus exercise discretion when encountering cases they view as
‘deserving’ (Zacka 2017). In their exercise of discretion, Lipsky argues, street-level bureaucrats effectively
make policy through their discretionary decision-making.
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context shows how immigration judges differ from other immigration enforcement field
agents. A few studies of judicial decision-making have broadened their scope beyond the
judicial characteristics to examine the logistical or managerial structure of judicial
decision-making. In a newly emerging literature on the organizational constraints that
immigration judges face, scholars have pointed to the complexity of immigration law
(Markowitz 2019), high stress from an enormous case backlog (Benson and Wheeler 2012;
Stuart L Lustig et al. 2008) and the unique hierarchy of the courts within the Department
of Justice, to illustrate some of the reasons judicial decision-making outcomes differ so
widely (Jain 2018; S. H Legomsky 2007). Drawing on the theory of street-level
bureaucracy, Asad’s study (2019) of judicial decision-making in immigration court
suggests that, when under bureaucratic and administrative pressure, judges often rely on
heuristic, patterned logics to make decisions in court.
Given this nascent research, and in response to calls to focus research efforts on the
internal processes of the immigration bureaucracy (Heyman 2012), this study examines the
experiences of judges on the ground, their working conditions, and experiences of
management. As initial work has examined the logistical constraints facing the
immigration court, I extend this empirical work to theorize at how immigration judges are
positioned both as representatives of the immigration state and subjects of it. I interrogate
the conceptualization of immigration court actors as discretionary, street-level bureaucrats.
I find that immigration judges experience specific managerial directives in their case
processing and workflow that shape both court outcomes as well as their experience of this
labor. These managerial tools include changing docket priorities and unpredictable speedups that lead to perceived inefficiency, limited independence, and reduce the availability
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of due process for noncitizens. By focusing on the internal work processes of this
bureaucracy, this study complicates our understanding of judges as primarily discretionary
decision-makers. I posit that immigration judges occupy a different occupational location
than other street-level immigration agents due to their unique position as both independent
decision-makers and state employees. I argue that their labor management operates as a
different form of migration control, distinct from macro-level border policy or front-line
decision-making of street-level bureaucrats.
Extending the scholarship on the bureaucratic implementation of immigration
policy, this study makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the emergent
literature on immigration control. I contribute the concept of micromanagement of
migration to describe how the state manages migration through reorganizing and
constraining the working conditions of its judges. By describing the micromanagement of
immigration judges, this case sheds light both on the management structure and working
conditions of the immigration courts, as well as the process through which banal
managerial changes can effectuate an anti-immigrant political agenda. Ultimately, this
research suggests we might reconceptualize immigration judges from autonomous
decision-makers to federal employees whose labor furthers the anti-immigrant social
control capacity of the state. As judicial labor in the immigration court system in the United
States reflects neither fully street-level bureaucracy and state-level migration control
policy, the study of immigration judges (and the labor of removal) offers a unique window
into a third way to understand the state’s migration control capacity.
Data and Methods
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This article is based on a novel set of 30 in-depth interviews with current (13) and
former (17) immigration judges, supplemented by archival materials from the National
Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and nine
months of ethnographic observations of judicial decision-making in a northeast
immigration court. The judge interviews, conducted between April 2020 and August 2021,
reflect more than 15 different hearing locations, and were recruited through the NAIJ and
additional snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted by phone and lasted between one
and two hours. With permission, many were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The semistructured topics cover a variety of themes, including the employment history, working
conditions, decision-making and discretion, and political and workplace identity of each
immigration judge.
Immigration judges are a notoriously hard-to-reach population, with ongoing
federal limitations on the ability of immigration judges to speak to the public or the press.19
In this sample, interviewees were current and former immigration judges from ten different
immigration courts around the United States, spanning the seven previous U.S. presidential
administrations. The judge perspectives represent the full history of the agency, from its
separation from Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) in 1982 through the present
day. The mean length of time on the bench for interview respondents was 16 years and a
range of 2-30 years. About 44 percent of interviewed judges were women and 56 percent

19

As I describe below, this is a January 2020 policy that prohibits the executive branch judges from,
according to the association, “seeking to speak or write publicly in their personal capacities, no matter the
topic, audience or venue” (Executive Office for Immigration Review 2020a).
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were men. They come from a range of racial and ethnic backgrounds, as well as previous
employment in private practice and government.
Because immigration judges are formally barred from speaking to the public, one
significant limitation to these data is that the interviews are primarily drawn from
immigration judges who felt professionally safe enough to speak to me. This included
judges who did not fear any pushback from management, or were protected by union
membership or leadership, or had recently resigned or retired. I experienced several
recruitment attempts with immigration judges who only agreed to speak to me informally
or declined to complete an interview altogether out of fear of reprisal from management.
These data then are not representative but reflect a more cautious perspective on the
management structure of this work, illustrating a narrower experience of the labor of
removal.
Using a modified inductive and abductive approach to qualitative analysis
(Timmermans and Tavory 2012), I repeatedly returned to my notes throughout the
interviewing and fieldwork process, developing and refining my questions and subsequent
observations in the courtroom. As my fieldwork progressed, I paid increasing attention to
how immigration judges experienced the labor of removal, including several mandated
changes to the labor structure and independence of judicial decision-making. As I re-read
and coded my data, I kept these themes in mind, searching for evidence that confirmed or
disconfirmed the emerging categories. I coded my fieldnotes using the qualitative software,
Atlas.ti to organize and clarify my findings.
Findings
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I find that several management directives shape the process and experience of
immigration adjudication for judges and noncitizens. Within the organizational structure
of EOIR, immigration judges are subject to changing conditions that are often at odds with
the independent authority and discretion afforded to them by statute. By identifying
seemingly banal administrative changes in judicial working conditions, this article
illustrates the structural constraints faced by immigration decision-makers, and how the
micromanagement of labor has a significant impact on the outcome of immigration
proceedings. I draw on judge narratives to identify two primary tactics of judicial
micromanagement: shifting priorities and increasing speed. While these tools of
managerial control may perhaps appear minor or innocuous – merely the routine
adjustments of shifting bureaucratic imperatives – I highlight in the following sections how
judges experience the consequences of these directives on the ground, primarily through
an inefficient work-flow process, limited independence, and reduced due process afforded
to immigrant respondents. While all judges expressed concern at these managerial tactics,
judges who had more experience on the bench or were closer to retirement age expressed
feeling less pressure (and micromanagement) in their work and decision-making.
Managing the Decision-Makers
Within the structure of the immigration court, there are several procedural changes
that have remapped the experience of adjudication for all parties. Specifically, immigration
judges, under the direct management of the U.S. Attorney General, have received directives
that 1) impose external priorities, which dictate the removal cases the administration would
like to be heard first, and 2) increase the speed of adjudication, which limits the time that
cases can remain on the court docket. Together, these two seemingly banal procedural
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shifts have significant consequences for the process and outcomes of immigration
adjudication.
By illuminating these procedural changes to how immigration judges must
adjudicate cases, this article complicates our understanding of immigration judges as streetlevel bureaucrats. In describing judges’ experiences with court policy-in-action, I show
how immigration judges perceive their decision-making and independence to be curtailed
by management. Specifically, this article finds that immigration judges experience
heightened bureaucratic inefficiency, compromised judicial independence, and reduced
due process rights afforded to noncitizens as a direct result of managerial directives. I argue
that immigration judges, often thought of as independent decision-makers, are also subjects
of the federal immigration state, and are subject to discipline and control from
management. Further, I argue that these managerial changes produce significant inequality
in the bureaucracy of migration control for the noncitizens. By externally managing the
timing and scope of judges’ decisions, the administration effectively limits access to legal
representation and preparation for noncitizens in immigration court. As such, this article
both sheds light on how scholars conceptualize judicial independence and has significant
implications for the independence of the immigration court system and access to fair
hearings. In the subsequent paragraphs, I first define the two managerial tactics of shifting
priorities and increasing speed, and next I draw on the perspectives of judges to better
understand the costs on the ground of these managerial directives.
Shifting Priorities and Increasing Speed in Adjudication
One of the primary practices of judicial management is the use of ‘shifting
priorities’ in immigration adjudication, ostensibly to reduce backlogged cases or tackle
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certain politically expedient immigration interests (American Immigration Lawyers
Association 2018). In this approach, the Attorney General issues new directive guidance
to immigration judges on how to order their cases in court. Updated priority guidance is
implemented by management, from the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to the
Assistance Chief Immigration Judges in each hearing location. These new directives are
often in response to external, political immigration concerns (e.g., border surges), rather
than in accordance with the internal functioning of each judges’ docket. In immigration
court, judges frequently hear multiple cases a day, and are often scheduled several years
into the future; yet with new prioritizations, judges must re-calendar all their previous cases
to reflect updated priorities. Rearranging dockets requires a significant amount of
bureaucratic effort, communication, and organization.
Another practice frequently used by management is the practice of increasing the
rate at which immigration judges adjudicate cases. This practice is related to the practice
of docket prioritization but deals specifically with the time frame in which cases are
expected to be heard and decided by immigration judges (Hausman and Srikantiah 2015).
The practice of ‘increasing speed’ is exemplified in the introduction of strict quantitative
performance metrics20 in 2018 but has been a key feature of managerial control for decades.
Increasing speed refers to guidance from the Attorney General that defines the time frame
in which a case can be heard, whether and how frequently judges can grant continuances

20

In 2017, U.S. Attorney General Sessions introduced quantitative performance metrics to guide the
adjudication of immigration cases. They included a 7-point set of evaluation criteria, including a
requirement to complete 700 cases per year, and 95 percent of cases should be heard on the initial
scheduled individual merits hearing date (Office of the Attorney General 2017). While these metrics have
been temporarily paused under the Biden administration, there is currently a plan to implement new judicial
performance metrics in the near future.
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in cases, and how many cases a judge needs to decide during the calendar year. While all
judges experienced this managerial tactic, older and more experienced judges were more
able to circumvent these directives, while newer, less experienced judges felt more
vulnerable to the pressure of increasing speeds, as I detail below. Overall, judges primarily
found the pressure of increasing speed to be overwhelming and difficult.
The Costs of Management
The management of judges and judicial working conditions, I argue, is one way
that the state retains control over the process of immigration enforcement. Rather than
allowing immigration judges to be independent decision-makers in removal proceedings,
the existing structure of the immigration adjudication system positions judges as subjects
of the immigration enforcement apparatus, vulnerable to the directives, control, and
discipline by management. As the state imposes the directives of reprioritization and speed,
interviews with former and sitting immigration judges reveal the costs of micromanaging
this workforce.
Bureaucratic Inefficiency
First, judges described the practice of shifting priorities as a key feature of
adjudication in which they had very little control over which cases they were allowed to
process. While ostensibly imposed by management to prioritize politically important cases
to process, the practice of shifting priorities more frequently produced a deeply felt sense
of bureaucratic inefficiency. Judges portrayed this process as frequent, arbitrary, and
nonsensical: “all the other cases have to be shuffled. The whole docket must be upturned
and shuffled to make room, so we can get to those prioritized cases. It’s very destructive
and counterproductive.” Specifically, they lamented the shifting administrative priorities
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as an inefficient condition of work. One such priority shift was a specialized docket priority
to expedite the “family unit”21 cases in immigration court, described below. In this
following example, the judge describes how this management technique disrupts
organizational calendaring efforts on the part of judges:

Every administration has tried to manipulate the dockets in a way to try to address
the backlog, but every time they do that it just blows up, because the people that
know how best to manage their docket are the judges, not management. The family
docket was a perfect example. In many ways, these divided dockets completely
backfire as we found out during the Obama Administration rocket dockets. There
was this push to expedite family units and complete children's cases and then it
ultimately backfired because the dockets exploded, and judges kept resetting cases.
It's simple math when you have the pace of NTAs that we we’re facing. Eventually
judges couldn't even schedule the cases that were supposed to be expedited within
the expedited time frame because there just wasn't space in the calendar.
As described above, dockets quickly become unwieldly when judges face external
pressures to reorganize their dockets to suit the needs of outside, politically motivated
managers. This tactic was extremely common; as another judge described, new priorities
could reshuffle the dockets every few months, saying “every six months you get a list of
cases that were over a certain age, or had some other characteristic, and you rearrange your
whole schedule to make sure those cases are on calendar and others are bumped. There was
this constant sense of ‘aimless docket reshuffling.’ We spent an awful lot of judge time,
staff time, and resources shuffling cases around on the calendar.” Another judge described

21

In 2014, the Obama Administration introduced a dedicated docket to prioritize the cases of adults with
children, termed the “AWC,” or colloquially, the “rocket” docket. In 2018 Trump administration, this
practice was expedited with the benchmark of processing “Family Unit” cases within less than one year (J.
McHenry 2018) for the courts in Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New
Orleans, New York City, and San Francisco. The dedicated docket has continued under the Biden
administration with the goal of reaching a decision on family cases within 300 days for Denver, Detroit, El
Paso, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York City, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle courts. This
practice has been heavily criticized by immigration advocates.
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that the process would not only expend judge and staff resources on reorganizing the cases,
but also contributed to the growing backlog of cases:
Nobody ever finished one priority before [the administration] started to turn to
another one. That is how you started to build backlog. As the priorities changed you
were encouraged to move the new priority up and push everything else back, which
of course resulted in chaos. There was never a consistent enough and long-term
enough set of priorities or goals that was effective because it would change with
the administration or somebody would come to Congress and testify in front of a
committee that some awful thing was happening, these cases weren't getting taken
care of, and suddenly boom, the one-headed monster would turn its head towards
that set of cases. It felt to me like it was this one-headed monster, and it would
suddenly pivot and focus on a new feeding place.
By not allowing judges to manage their own dockets, this practice limits the control
individual judges have over the processing and flow in their own courtrooms. As priorities
are set by the president’s administration, constantly changing priorities put judges and the
courts at the mercy of politicized concerns. One longtime judge described how this process
was disorienting to work in, produced a backlogged and inefficient bureaucratic process,
and removed any control that the judges had over their own dockets:

I prefer to have a hand in resetting my own docket. And I think most of the judges
did. When there was that huge surge at the border towards the end of the Obama
administration, there's just no way that we could keep up with the numbers, because
so many new cases were coming in. It made for a disorienting work environment.
We basically had to just move stuff en masse from where it was to the end of the
calendar. Sometimes they didn't even reset it, they just parked it someplace. The
prioritization, I think, makes the court less productive because we're spending so
much of our time rescheduling shit that we're not spending as much time getting
the stuff done.
In direct contrast to the widespread characterization in the literature that immigration
judges are highly independent and autonomous decision-makers, this practice of
reprioritizations and speed highlight how little control individual judges have over their
own dockets. While the administration can decide how and when they want to expedite
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certain hearings, judges have very little input into how this approach will impact the load
on the dockets or is feasible in their court. Frequently, reprioritizations and speed-ups
resulted in heightened inefficiency in court, judicial strain, and backlog. One effect was
that judges frequently felt burdened by this practice, resulting and burnout and resignations.
After experiencing the effects of the speed-ups, one judge told me, she decided to resign,
saying: “there's just no way that I can do it, I just can't handle this pressure of all of these
cases that have been front-loaded, that I’m responsible for in the next couple of months.”
Compromised Judicial Independence
In addition to the heightened bureaucratic inefficiency, speed-ups and
reprioritizations by management have the compounding cost of undercutting judicial
independence in decision-making. As one judge described for me, the effect of speeding
up cases was that she had very little time to think about nuances in the law when
adjudicating cases because she was constantly fearful that she would lose her job for not
processing cases quickly enough. She described the pressure she felt when managers urged
her to speed up cases:
From the standpoint of my managers, they want my cases to be heard quickly. I
have to look at the dashboard on my computer and see how quickly the cases must
be heard in order to be meeting my goals, my numbers. We have extraordinary
pressure on one side: the agency tells us you've got to continue to provide due
process, of course, however, we have performance measures that say you’ve got to
decide the case after the individual hearing. If you grant a continuance following
an individual hearing, you can be fired, essentially. You can be fired for that. You
could be subject to discipline. I try to stay vigilant and only think about what each
individual case requires, but it’s often at odds with my own personal desire to
actually keep my job and not risk it by granting a continuance. That is what the
stakes are for the judges that are currently presiding over cases.
In this example, the judge highlights the profoundly contradictory experience of trying to
ensure due process rights for the noncitizens with cases in court, and the workplace
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pressure to keep up with the caseloads. On top of that challenge, she described how her job
is also on the line. This, I argue, is a stark example of one of the limitations to
conceptualizing judges as street-level bureaucrats. Another judge echoed this sentiment,
by describing the challenge of having to consider how managerial oversight interferes with
their judicial independence:
That's where it really was the beginning of the end for judges having the ability to
control their docket because now you have the inappropriate consideration of: am
I going to be rated down because I grant someone a continuance? It never should
be in the judge's personal interest whether or not something like that is granted or
denied, but convolutedly now it is.
By increasing speed, judges feel squeezed between the dual mandates of trying to provide
due process and completing cases as expediently as possible. The process of increasing
speed is often at odds with values of judicial independence and due process. For many
judges, the current management directives put their jobs at risk as they attempt to respond
to the pressures of providing due process and completing cases efficiently. Another judge
elaborated on this point, adding that the condition of increasing speed goes against due
process afforded to respondents in court, no matter the backlog and political pressures:

The answer can never be, “well there's a backlog, so I have to do your case faster,
sir.” The answer must be your case gets a full and complete review that's compliant
with due process. It ignores that there's a backlog. So, this is this tension that the
courts are dealing with, and that's what the judges are faced with, this tension, I
guess if I was going to call it one thing, it's a tension between trying to meet the
pressures of that due process and the Constitution require, with the pressure that the
administration has been imposing on the judges to hear cases faster.
These examples of the managerial directives, in which judges must navigate between their
discretionary, independent decision-making and managerial expectations to meet external
work evaluations, to not be rated down, affected most judges in this sample. However, in
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contrast to the previous complaints, one judge described how his personal circumstances
allowed him to avoid some of the workplace pressure:

I don’t feel a great deal of pressure. One, because they shouldn't be managing a
judge. The law says I have independent decision-making authority and so let me do
that. Two, because of my background, I just don't care. You fire me? Great. I'll
triple my pay in a matter of a month. I'll find a new job. Maybe I'm just deluding
myself in this climate, but for a variety of reasons – primarily, my wife, who works
full-time as an attorney in a corporate law job, I don't feel like, I'm not worried
about keeping my job. If they fire me because I'm doing what's the right thing to
do, that's fine, fine if they fire me. I feel that gives me more freedom than other
judges who don't have that safety net, in a way. It feels like I have a safety net.
Immigration is what I've been doing for four years, and for the 20 years before that,
I did lots of other things. I'm good at it and I can do other things. If I can't, then my
wife will support me.
This shows how it is only though certain external factors (financial stability, union
membership, or age and experience), judges can avoid some of the working condition
pressure of this workplace. As one judge added:

I'm more confident because I've been an active union member for so many years.
I'm confident I could push back if a manager tried to underrate me and say that I
failed in this metric and therefore I have unsatisfactory performance metrics. I'm
more confident in my ability to fight that rating.
With the added context that the judges’ union is actively being dismantled by political
interests, the ability of judges to push back against this state pressure and diminished
workplace conditions is increasingly in jeopardy. Rather than being independent
adjudicators engaged in the emotionally and legally difficult work of adjudicating the
removal proceedings of noncitizens, these working conditions and political context in
which judges operate highlights how their position is one of dependence and
micromanagement, in turn producing intense precarity for noncitizen respondents in
removal proceedings.
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Another judge added that his work no longer reflects careful adjudication, but that
managerial changes have shifted the working conditions to those of a rubber-stamping
removal officer, with little discretion or creativity:
The unremitting pressure that [judges] are under has transformed the job much
more towards an assembly line, rather than a thoughtful consideration. You don't
have time to contemplate slowly. The level of meddling, the level of trying to
constrain the discretion of judges, the level of trying to reduce us to mere rubberstamping adjudicators, rather than lawyers, creative lawyers and judges who can
have those unique approaches to a case, which may be beyond the creative realm
of the management people and without the agenda.
With an assembly-line approach to the adjudication of legal cases, it is of even greater
importance to consider the impact and cost to noncitizens with cases in court.
Reduced Due Process for Respondents
Importantly, this study indicates that judicial management not only reshapes the
working conditions and independence of immigration judges but produces significant
inequality for the noncitizen respondents in immigration court as well. While exact
quantitative changes to the outcomes of immigration court proceedings (as a result of
managerial changes) is outside the scope of this paper, judges provided important insight
into how such changes remap the processes noncitizens experience as a result of speed up
and reprioritizations in court. As described above, judges suggest that the managerial
tactics of external prioritization and speed-ups contribute to case processing that favors
denials, reducing the creative, thoughtful approach granted to judges by the statute. One
judge described how if cases are rushed to completion, respondents are less able to access
the resources to succeed in court, and are not afforded full due process rights:

Those are the tools. The encroachment into judicial decision-making is that there
are some decisions which look like they are administrative – like how the docket is
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organized – end up affecting the substance of the case. If you tell me to put the
family unit cases at the front of the line, newly arrived like they did in 2014 under
the Obama administration, and again in 2017 under the Trump administration, they
ended up not only hurting the people who didn't have time to get lawyers, to get
their bearings, to gather evidence, to be prepared, to present a strong case, there
were people who have just been traumatized. People suffer post-traumatic stress
from the journey through Mexico, even if they weren't physically assaulted in their
home country, but they feared the worst pain.
More simply put, another judge added, “one way of doing that has been to speed things
through the courts so that people don't have time to prepare, people don't have time to find
lawyers, people don't have time for remedies to ripen the way they used to normally do
that.” Not only do the managerial processes reshape the logistics of removal proceedings
(e.g. finding a lawyer, accumulating documents), but there is a lasting emotional impact as
well. Another judge said to me:

[The management changes] impact the respondent. This constant delay and speed
up is very charged emotionally for an individual. Trust me, we all understand this.
We [ judges] are fettered and limited to the level of control that we can exercise to
remedy the problem. Can you imagine the harm and concern that individuals face
waiting to have their day in court? I often get motions from respondents who are
undergoing trauma, psychological and emotional trauma, just waiting to have their
day in court. It is overwhelming, just overwhelming. Judges are mindful of these
needs of individuals and yet we are in a system and a process that, these systemic
failures and systematic encroachment, do not allow us to remedy it. They just do
not.
This judge indicated that she was aware of, but unable to address, what she saw as harsh
treatment of respondents, and found that the state was negatively harming immigrants by
manipulating the working conditions of immigration judges. This perception indicates that
the seemingly banal shifts in how judges are managed and how courts are directed to
process their cases, have serious consequences for the substance and outcome of
immigration cases.
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The prioritizing of cases to meet a political agenda, such as “we are protecting our
border,” undermines the ability for us to proceed in the most just and fair fashion
by not allowing the cases that we felt were ready and well-prepared to go first. And
not letting those other [individuals] take the time they needed to get their bearings
and find a permanent place to live and get their ties to the community established,
so they find a pro bono lawyer. If we allowed them that time, they're able to find
out what their options are, so that when they come to court, they are much more
coherent from our Western point of view. That's the way in which these
administrative decisions have undermined the ability of a judge to control his or her
docket in the most efficient and effective way.
While immigration judges do have some independence granted by the statute, their
independence is curtailed in specific ways by their dependent position with the
bureaucracy. These findings extend our knowledge about immigration decision-making
and bureaucratic functioning, shedding light on the banal ways that the state disadvantages
both adjudicators and noncitizens within a broader trajectory of contemporary punitive
immigration policy. This is important because it shows how the state can introduce
ostensibly neutral management directives to its bureaucrats, yet reshape the process,
experience, and outcome of immigration adjudication in practice. These findings have
implications not just for better understanding the organizational structure of immigration
enforcement and judicial independence, but for the fair administration of justice within
U.S. immigration courts. Despite the stated goals of the administration to tackle certain
political immigration issues, judges perceive this managerial directive to be a needless
micromanaging tactic that disrupts their work and unfairly disadvantages the respondents
in court. Indeed, during the last four years the backlogged cases on the court’s dockets have
grown exponentially, to more than 1.5 million pending cases in 2022 (TRAC 2022).
Discussion
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Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with current and former immigration judges,
this article has presented the case of immigration judge management and introduced the
concept of the micromanagement of migration in order to highlight the underexamined link
between the state’s immigration enforcement efforts, judicial labor management, and
immigrant precarity and control. Judicial decision-making and the labor of street-level
bureaucrats are increasingly well-studied facets of the immigration enforcement apparatus;
yet, by focusing on the ways that judicial decision-making is managed through banal
bureaucratic changes, this article illustrates how the state increases migrant precarity by
more tightly managing the labor process of its immigration judges. This study reveals how
immigration judges are also subjects of the immigration state, while simultaneously
working to represent it. Requiring judges to continually reorganize their case processing
according to politicized interests and reducing the amount of time in which cases can be
heard produces a bureaucratic setting that is inefficient, rushed, and reduces the
opportunities for noncitizens to prepare their cases for court. Once we position immigration
judges as subjects of state control within the bureaucracy of immigration court, we can see
how court outcomes are determined not only by judicial demographics (Ramji-Nogales
2007), but also by a nearly invisible system of procedural managerial directives that remap
the outcome of removal hearings. Using the concept of the micromanagement of migration
illustrates the meso-level migration control that occurs through bureaucratic management
meriting additional attention.
The case of immigration judge management has critical policy implications for how
we conceptualize the independence of the immigration court, as well as the importance of
the judges’ union. Within the immigration enforcement system, the right to a court hearing
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in a removal case is crucial. However, if that bureaucratic system operates solely under the
direction of the Executive branch, the independence of this judicial system remains at the
political whim of the changing political landscape. Numerous immigration advocates,
judges, and scholars have called for a massive overhaul of the immigration court system
that would relocate it into the judiciary as an Article III court, rather than an administrative
agency within the executive branch. This study underscores the tensions that arise when
managerial directives are in conflict with the mechanisms through which judges retain
docket control, sufficient time for decision-making, and assure the due process rights of
the noncitizens in court. Within this system, the judges’ union is vital to securing these
working conditions that allow judges to maintain discretionary independence.
In this study, I draw on the voices of current and former immigration judges to
illustrate the lived costs to adjudicating under politicized managerial directives. This
perspective allows for a greater understanding of the on-the-ground functioning of the
immigration court, and the lived consequences of managerial policy decisions. However,
while this approach produces new insights, it is not without its limitations. This analysis
focuses on the experiences of judges within the court bureaucracy, yet the reliance on
interviews with judges overlooks the perspectives of managers and noncitizens who are
similarly invoked in this discussion. We need additional research on noncitizen
respondents about the impact of procedural court changes, as well as agency-level analysis
about policy decision-making into how such procedural changes go into effect. Among
other things, these studies might assess why higher-level bureaucrats impose politicized
managerial directives, while judges chafe at the policy changes.
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By focusing on the judges as subjects of the immigration state, this article suggests,
but doesn’t fully examine the ways that the immigration enforcement apparatus
systematically disadvantages noncitizens seeking relief from removal. Legal, procedural,
and logistical conditions put noncitizens at a disadvantage when it comes to advocating for
their rights to a fair hearing. Moving forward, future research might investigate how such
systematic changes have quantitatively changed the outcomes of immigration court
proceedings for noncitizens.

87

CONCLUSION
With the aim of better understanding how the US immigration courts function on
the ground, this dissertation has looked at the constraints, logics, and strategies for court
actors involved in the labor of removal. Drawing on the different perspectives of
immigration attorneys, prosecutors, and immigration judges, the three articles of this
dissertation examine how the work of this immigration enforcement apparatus is managed
through these bureaucrats.
In the first article, I have asked a two-part question: first, what is the relationship
between bureaucratic time and legal viability in the immigration court, and second, how
do attorneys manage this temporal landscape? I offer the conceptual framework of legal
temporality to better understand the landscape in which attorneys and noncitizens must
navigate the logics of waiting. I find that attorneys and noncitizens often attempt to
strategically expedite or delay proceedings, illuminating how delays imposed by the state
are not always a form of punishment but can often be a benefit for individuals whose cases
don’t align with the limited legal categories of immigration law. Given the pervasive
instability in time and law, waiting is sometimes the best option for noncitizens whose
alternative is deportation.
In the second article, I ask: how do enforcement bureaucrats make sense of their
labor when faced with uneven public support? Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews with ICE
attorneys, I identify three primary, co-constitutive narratives of self-legitimacy, including:
1) a strongly internalized a sense of role and duty to existing law, 2) a moral authority as
patriotic “white knights” protecting the nation from threats, and 3) persistent allegations of
immigration fraud, diminishing noncitizens’ humanity and claims of persecution (for
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asylum). Taken together, these three occupational narratives that make up what I term
bureaucratic entrenchment, revealing the social psychology – and source of self-legitimacy
– that ICE prosecutors use to manage tensions in relation to their occupational role.
Finally, I examine judges’ working conditions within the immigration court,
finding that the management of immigration judges is linked with the state’s immigration
enforcement efforts and immigrant precarity and control. Requiring judges to continually
reorganize their case processing according to politicized interests and reducing the amount
of time in which cases can be heard produces a bureaucratic setting that is inefficient,
rushed, and reduces the opportunities for noncitizens to prepare their cases for court. Using
the concept of the micromanagement of migration illustrates the meso-level migration
control that occurs through bureaucratic management meriting additional attention.
Limitations and Future Research
Despite the broad scope of these three articles, which delve into the working
conditions of court bureaucrats and representatives, there are several significant limitations
to this work that I acknowledge here. First and foremost, the experiences of immigrant
respondents are largely absent from this accounting. In many ways, this mirrors what I saw
in court observations – proceedings occur rapidly, in English, and with advanced legal
jargon that is inaccessible to most non-lawyers – in many ways, the individuals whose lives
were being decided in these courtrooms were somewhat secondary to the negotiation on
the floor between these bureaucrats and attorneys. Yet, the outcome of the process has
important social implications for the lives of immigrants and their families. In this
dissertation work, the choice to focus on the labor and constraints within the bureaucracy
is deliberate. While there are many studies that have helped us understand the embedded
89

inequality and resistance in immigrants’ experience of immigration enforcement, of
comparable importance is how immigration enforcement operates from the perspective of
court bureaucrats. In response to recent calls to investigate the “villains” of policy rather
than the “victims,” and the “self-interested actions of those who benefit from the social
construction and political manufacture of immigration crises when none really exist”
(Massey 2015:279; Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006; Prasad 2018; Vega 2018)), this
dissertation is concerned with how agents who represent the state in this politically
contested field manage, think about, experience this labor of removal – and what insights
it can provide to improve it.
Secondly, the insights of this research don’t yet fully allow us to see beyond this
case, or understand these trends operate in the broader enforcement legal system. For
example, while the ICE attorneys I spoke to share their logics and narratives of legitimacy,
I don’t have insight into how these narratives extended into their broader professional or
personal life, or how they might shift in other contexts. Further, while immigration judges
lamented the managerial changes and the impacts to removal decision-making, I am unable
to test how and whether these managerial changes produced significant differences in the
court outcomes for noncitizens across the country in quantitative terms. As such, more
research, including additional observations, interviews with respondents and managers,
and quantitative analyses would be important to continue with this line of inquiry.
As such, future research would be well-positioned to examine these trends in
greater breadth and depth, generalizing across immigration courts or diving more deeply
into the observational data in a single court. Empirically, there is plenty of opportunity to
expand this project. Although just a fraction of the data produced for this written
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dissertation project was used in the analysis for these articles, I have extensive
observational data that would provide ample material to further elaborate the perspectives
and strategies used within the court. Additionally, linking these findings with the
quantitative outcomes from immigration court would provide richness and well-informed
data science that would improve this court system.
Given the broad themes contained here – of labor, strategy, and identity – the three
dissertation articles here are a first step toward illuminating the black box of the
immigration court functioning on the ground. Every year, thousands of individuals must
navigate this complex bureaucracy in search of safety and security in the United States,
and this dissertation aims to understand what that process looks like. In addition, this legal
process is central to the construction of a fair and well-functioning legal system for
regulating immigration. Aside from a handful of studies and reports, the workings of US
immigration courts have remained relatively unexamined. This study of the bureaucracy of
removal provides several important additions, including immigration attorneys’ strategies
related to time and temporality, legitimacy and identity narratives of ICE attorneys, and the
management constraints faced by immigration judges, all of which contribute to our
knowledge of this legal and bureaucratic system, with the broader aim of supporting the
lives and outcomes of the immigrants whose lives are caught in this system.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Steps in Removal Proceedings from U.S. Immigration Court

Source: Author’s adaptation of agency documents
from the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)
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Figure 1.1: Total Pending Cases in US Immigration Courts, 1998 2022
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Data for graph reflects the total pending cases for the Executive Office for Immigration
Review and is derived from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)
(2022). Note: Red-shaded bars reflect the start of each new presidential administration.

Table 2.1: ICE Attorney Sample Characteristics
(N=40)
Gender
Male
Female
Race/Ethnicity
White
Latino/Hispanic
Asian
Black
Middle Eastern
Mixed/Other

%
40
60
62.5
7.5
10
2.5
5
7.5

Average Years with ICE
1-5
6-10
10+
No response
Previous Employment
108

30
20
42.5
7.5

Former Prosecutor
(ICE/INS/CBP, State)
Other Position with Federal
Government
Private Practice/Academic
First Job/No previous job

10
12.5
22.5

Conservative
Republican
Center/Independent
Democrat
Liberal/Left
None/Prefer Not to Answer

7.5
5
22.5
40
10
15

55

Political Affiliation

Age (Years)
Mean Age (Years)
Married

32-58
42.5
Single
Married/Partnered
No response

10
60
25

English Only
Multilingual
No response

40
50
10

Languages Spoken

Figure 3.1: Hierarchy of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
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Department of Justice
US Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Director of EOIR
Deputy Director of EOIR
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
Chief Immigration Judge
Principal Deputy Chief Immigration Judge
Deputy Chief Immigration Judge
Assistant Chief Immigration Judge
Immigration Judge
Note: Author’s depiction based on EOIR documents and source materials.
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